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Introduction 

 "Turning to the NATO operation over Libya, it has become painfully clear that similar 
shortcomings – in capability and will –have the potential to jeopardise the alliance’s ability to 
conduct an integrated, effective and sustained air-sea campaign"  1
It is necessary here, as all history does, to begin at the end - and the above excerpt from a 
speech by then US Defence Secretary brings us to end of a remarkable period in the history of 
the North Atlantic Alliance. Remarkable because in a shade over 20 years it had seen more 
action than in the previous 40; remarkable because it had almost doubled in size, with the 
addition of states to which it had previously held plans to atomise; and remarkable because this 
20 years of action had taken place without the existence of a single, solid threat that had been 
its very reason for existence. Secretary Gates' words in Brussels were very much a new 
arrangement of an old song, but there was a new riff which unnerved many. 
"Indeed, if current trends in the decline of European defence capabilities are not halted and 
reversed,  Future U.S. political leaders– those for whom the Cold War was not the formative 
experience that it was for me – may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO 
worth the cost."  2
Possibly the most remarkable aspect of these last two decades, has been the fact that all these 
previously noted remarkable events had taken place with a backdrop of plummeting defence 
spending throughout Europe. As NATO had moved out 'out of area', US priorities had moved 
out of Europe too. This return to more familiar Mediterranean shores had made the new NATO 
look more akin to the beautiful but desolate ruins of Leptis Magna - although some of the 
statistics used by Gates to underline his point also could speak as a testament to the 
organisation's success. 
That the alliance now had 28 members to vote in support of the operation was a result of the 
hand extended by NATO to the post-communist states of Europe - an offer which resulted in 
another offer to bring most of these states into the EU, just as NATO membership had provided 
a foundation for European integration in the 1950s. Furthermore, that this Libya intervention 
had happened at all, and with such unanimous support spoke to the furtherance of the 
transformation of the Alliance and its objectives, when it could have simply packed up and 
gone home after the end of the Cold War. 
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Gates was introduced that day by former Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer , a 3
Dutchman who many believe was elected as a result of his country's efforts in the Kosovo 
conflict that closed the chapter on the immediate post-Cold War era. His successor was a 
Danish Prime Minister who many believe had been elected himself as a result of his country's 
foreign policy transformation, culminating in its role in some of the toughest fighting in the 
Afghan conflict.  
There were of course other, less poetic reasons for the elections of these two very capable men, 
but their prominence cannot hide the fact that in classically realist foreign policy terms, they 
should not be there at all. For the fundamental shift in the thinking & operations of NATO as a 
whole had also presented an opportunity for its smaller members to sail off the end of the flat-
earth realist map. 
The traditional 'small state dilemma' gave them two options in a lawless global system: hide or 
bind. The former option had proven useful for most, staying out of the way of the 'Great Powers' 
from the days of Napoleon until many were invaded by Wehrmacht in the Second World War. 
Thereafter, most chose the latter option, with an American 'Empire by Invitation'  or a 4
somewhat less cordial place in the Soviet Bloc almost an inevitability. The emergence of a more 
rules-based system from the 1950s onwards, and particularly after 1989 has allowed this 
assumption to be questioned, with concepts like 'activist foreign policy, ‘norm 
entrepreneurship' or 'smart state strategy' allowing the smaller states of Europe more latitude. 
Indeed, when Gates spoke of a 'two tier NATO' , the two tiers were understood differently than 5
they would have been in the Cold War. Small states like Denmark, Netherlands and Norway 
were undoubtedly in the top tier, given their efforts over the previous two decades, whereas 
larger states like Italy or even Germany, who were previously on the front line, were unsure of 
what tier they would fall into. Denmark and Norway are explicitly mentioned in the Gates 
speech as having struck around 1/3 of the targets (to that point) despite providing 'only' about 
1/8th of the aircraft. 
That states whose combined population is still smaller than the small state which separates 
them could provide such a high proportion of aircraft to such a broad-based international 
mission is could be seen as a mere statistical aberration, but we shall see over the course of this 
research that it is a result of a concerted, long term effort by these states to make themselves 
relevant in international affairs. That Denmark, Netherlands and Norway are still relatively weak 
has not changed, but the way in which they have used the little power they have is important -
and while their contributions may not have been vital in NATO operations over the last 20 
years, they have certainly been noticed.  
These 'mice' may not be invading a superpower in the manner of the fictional Duchy of Grand 
Fenwick in the 1959 Peter Sellers comedy The Mouse that Roared, but they have undoubtedly 
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made their voices heard in international affairs - and it is the purpose of this paper to examine 
precisely the strategies they have pursued in order to do so. 
While national histories of individual small states have obviously been written, there has been 
precious little Historical collective study of how small states act in international institutions. As 
a result, most of the concepts for this study will be borrowed from International Relations or 
Political Science – though History does provide us with the genesis of the term: even if it was in 
opposition to the ‘Great Powers’ style of Political History which grew up after the Congress of 
Vienna. These powers felt their various non-core accoutrements distinguished them sufficiently 
from ‘Middle’ powers, who in turn needed to distinguish themselves from those deemed to be 
entirely inconsequential: these became the ‘small states’.   6
The Age of Empires necessarily ensured that small states rarely survived, the systematic shocks 
of the two World Wars broke these Great Powers apart and scattered their remnants around in 
the form of small states which drew the interests of the new Empires. Beginning from the late 
1950s (in English ), with Annette Baker Fox’s The Power of Small States, IR theorists began to 7
tentatively examine these states which the dominant theories of their discipline had no time for. 
Such studies often focused intensely on the very powerlessness of the ‘system-ineffective’ states 
before the power of the ‘system-determining’ ones . 8
The 1960s and 70s ‘heyday’ of small states studies was gradually replaced by an increased 
indifference  as it became clear even the instability caused by such a proliferation of weak 9
states would do little to  disrupt a system anchored so firmly in two places. This changed, 
however, with the fall of the Soviet Empire, precipitated, in part by its invasion of a small state. 
Afghanistan itself is a good example of respecting Baker-Fox's observation that ‘what is 
impressive is the variety of circumstances under which the power of a small state…turns out to 
be greater than any inventory of its internal resources would suggest’ .  10
The fall of a great power before a seemingly insignificant one is almost historical cliché, and so 
it was maybe the rash of newly enabled states after 1989, with only Poland and Ukraine among 
them not (what most consider) small, that brought renewed interest in small state studies. First, 
as small states like Rwanda and Yugoslavia drew the world’s attention as they descended into 
genocidal violence; then as a result of a new, constructivist, realisation that certain small states 
were thriving in the international system almost because of their smallness . Nevertheless, it 11
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remains something of a niche topic, with the only global institute for the study of small states 
located, appropriately, at the University of Iceland in Reykjavik . 12
While all these academics agree on the usefulness of small state studies, they don’t agree on 
what makes a small state. Many papers on the topic begin with a long debate on what actually 
constitutes smallness, but while Robert Keohane’s initial assertion in Lilliputian’s Dilemas that ‘it 
is clearly inadequate to describe them [small states] merely in terms of being less powerful’ was 
good for the 1960s, Mouritzen & Wivel’s  definition of a small state as the ‘weak part in an 
asymmetric relationship’  is better suited to an increasingly polycentric world: allowing for 13
states to be strong in some relationships, but weak in others. Thus, Albania may have ‘relational 
power’   when dealing with Kosovo, but ‘relational weakness’ when dealing with Greece– and 14
more pertinently for this study: Denmark can almost consider itself a ‘great power’ when 
dealing Latvia, but small one when dealing with Russia. Using this definition of what constitutes 
a small state will allow us to better understand how our states function in the system.  
Even in a strictly realist, hard-power based-reading, all but 20 or so states are small, with the 
US still light years ahead in military terms . What a realist reading of history does not shed 15
light on, however, is how small states, together and separately, have worked towards creating 
an international system which is more liveable for them. Whether it be Malta pushing for the 
creation of the ICLS at the UN in the 1960s , or the role of Norway in facilitating the Oslo 16
Peace Accords of 1993, small states can, and have, made a big difference. In her 2002 article 
Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics, Christine Ingebritsen finds many 
significant accomplishments and an optimising of influence that confounds conventional 
power-based analyses. 
From the creation of the OSCE through the Helsinki process, to the foundation of the modern 
development aid system, or the concept of sustainable development and environmental 
management,  the Scandinavian nations have been fundamental in establishing, sustaining and 
institutionalising global norms which have brought a certain order to an anarchic global 
system . While classical small state notions of hiding or binding may have encouraged a 17
passive foreign policy, these states have pursued ‘social power’, and furthermore ‘this reputation 
is consciously cultivated and deepened as a cornerstone of Scandinavian diplomatic relations’ . 18
It is hoped over the course of this research to understand how ‘norm entrepreneurship’, often 
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understood in the context of the UN  or EU , can be extended into a more explicitly security-19 20
oriented institution like NATO. 
This is the most interesting concept in the formation of this paper: ‘militarily weak, 
economically dependent’  small states may not have the resources to form a broad based 21
foreign policy, but what they can do is use the means available to them (mainly through 
institutions) to find innovative ways out of the small state dilemma. Anders Wivel (2010) has 
described this as a ‘smart state’ strategy: by using the characteristics of an institution (in this 
case the EU), presenting initiatives with an emphasis on the general good, and using weakness 
as strength through being an ‘honest broker’, small states can get things done.  
Central to this strategy is being highly focused and knowledgeable of the system , and again in 22
this respect small states (and Scandinavian ones in particular) are at a certain advantage. A 
smaller group of foreign policy makers, and a tradition of consensus politics  allows for a 23
consistent and studied pursuit of foreign policy goals. The pursuit of these soft power objectives 
does not come without a hard power price, however, and even ‘norm entrepreneurs’ need an 
iron fist inside their spotless velvet gloves – these Scandinavian states have ‘punched above 
their weight’ in arms exports too, with neutral Sweden the world's 9th largest exporter of arms in 
2011  - selling fast jets to EU allies , and assorted other weaponry to regimes who seem 2425 26
somewhat less interested in human rights or the environment .  27
This is where the research in this project will attempt to explore areas often neglected by small 
state studies: while there have been studies of small states in the UN or the EU, there has been 
little examination of small states' hard power contributions to the Western security structure 
after the Cold War - despite, as noted earlier, new developments that call into question 
traditional interpretations of the influence/autonomy dilemma.  
There have also been studies of small states within the ESDP but this aspect of Western security 
is neither fully trusted or even tested, either by the small states or the 'great' European powers. 
There have also be certain ad-hoc coalitions constructed, most notably in Iraq, which have had 
significant small state support: but the gap between what others expect of small states, and what 
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they hope to gain in such an arrangement is much harder to measure than with institutions. 
NATO has remained, despite the existential angst, the clichéd 'cornerstone' of Western foreign 
policy - for all creatures great and small, and with the building of a billion-dollar headquarters 
in Brussels ,  that probably won’t change. 28
The angst though, has been well-founded - and that is why it is imperative to study those states 
who have always been able to do more with less. These should be acting in NATO as they 
would in EU, for the furtherance of their own national interest, and so it should also follow that 
the same opportunities (as well as the same pitfalls) will exist. Furthermore, NATO is an 
organisation, unlike the EU with its qualified majorities and weighted voting, which relies on 
consensus and the equality of each of its members. 
Besides examining how these states maximise their influence with NATO, I would also like to 
discover if maximising influence can lead to any real ability to shape policy, and if this 
influence in NATO is seen as integral to the more well-known aspects of 'norm 
entrepreneurship'. Strategic culture is central to this, as a 'tool kit'  which states use to further 29
their foreign policy aims - and by examining the practices of these three states it will be 
possible to understand how useful they consider this tool kit to be: if indeed 'culture is 
practice'  then examining the practice will allow us to better understand the culture. 30
If the role of NATO has changed, first by moving to a more offensive posture, then moving out 
of area, then it must also follow that the strategic cultures of its members have too. As we will 
see, some have reacted faster to the new opportunities afforded to members in the post-Cold 
War era, but all have changed nonetheless. How have our states changed their security policies 
in the modern era? Has this given them an institutional advantage in NATO? And does it reflect 
somehow on their own individual strategic cultures? 
Choosing the Northern European states to analyse was based on three points: membership of 
NATO; a history of ‘norm entrepreneurship’; and recognition of ‘smallness’. For the last point, 
while for the purposes of this paper ‘small’ is about asymmetric relationships, the UK, Germany, 
and to a lesser extent, Poland are still considered to be middle or large powers. A short, 
turbulent post-communist history has meant that the three Baltic States have been unable to 
develop a FP strategy which would qualify as ‘norm entrepreneurship’, although they will 
feature as recipients of (particularly Danish) influence. The first criteria was the most arbitrary, 
and discounted Ireland, Finland and Sweden – with the latter being particularly arbitrarily 
ignored as Swedish non-membership may not last long, and its levels of cooperation with 
NATO being extremely high .  Finally, Iceland, which fulfilled all of the criteria, was 31
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discounted for being perhaps too ‘system ineffective’: it would be hard to imagine the UK 
government using anti-terrorism legislation to seize bank assets  from larger NATO allies. 32
Of the three remaining states, Norway and Denmark fit easily into all three boxes, with 
Netherlands fitting less easily into the last one because of its size, and not being considered 
previously as a ‘norm entrepreneur’. While it was previously a Great Power, still has extra-
European territories and is a trading nation on a world level thanks to its highly developed 
infrastructure, in NATO terms it is happy to see itself as ‘the biggest of the small ones’  – 33
indeed it is generally accepted that the Netherlands is the upper limit for states which were 
traditionally considered small . In terms of its reputation as a ‘norm entrepreneur’, while its 34
government has not always had a reputation for being the greenest in Europe, it is the 7th largest 
foreign development aid donor, and the 5th per capita , just behind Denmark and Norway. 35
Finally, Article 90 of the Dutch Constitution states that it 'shall promote the development of the 
international legal order’ a sentiment which has generally been followed in Dutch Foreign 
Policy - with these things considered it must be considered strange that the Netherlands has not 
been considered alongside the Scandinavian states previously, with one notable exception from 
the Cold War . Particularly in the context of NATO and security, as we shall see, the 36
Netherlands also has much in common with its northern neighbours, underlined by a strong 
and longstanding commitment to the Atlantic partnership, and a wish to balance the established 
European powers to avoid marginalisation.  
In order to best understand the ways in which sought influence in NATO, we will examine three 
areas which best fit the resources available. Starting with 'capabilities', and the role of NATO in 
setting the agenda for its member states, mainly through the various strategic concepts agreed 
upon since the 1991 Rome Summit, where, in the midst of unrest and speculation in a Soviet 
Bloc that had not yet quite breathed its last, a radical plan was released that would allow the 
alliance to move towards the 21st century. Each of the three states will then be examined in 
alphabetical order, along with the internal dynamics and reactions to this new strategic 
situation that meant some states would adapt faster than others. This will also be the only time 
all three states are examined individually: this is not intended to be comparative history, and the 
research is not seeking to judge how each state has dealt with this change - it should be most 
interesting to understand what these states have done on a whole with their relatively similar 
'tool kits'- noting, when appropriate, the ‘best-practice’ models which could also be useful in a 
broader NATO context.  
As we go on to examine 'Conflicts', we will see that, at different conflicts brought differing 
levels of engagement from the three states, often dependent on the internal political situation. 
                                                                       11
 U.K. Used Anti-Terrorism Law to Seize Icelandic Bank Assets’’ Bloomberg News 09/10/2008 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?32
pid=newsarchive&sid=aXjIA5NzyM5c
 Rood, p.12133
 Neumann & Gstöhl, p.8134
 OECD35
 Flynn (1985)36
Starting with the mess of Bosnia, it will be noted that Kosovo provided a watershed moment for 
NATO and each of the states as they made a firm commitment to the alliance's new direction. 
The conflict in Afghanistan was obviously remarkable following after the first invocation of 
Article V, but it will be considered that the most significant aspect of the conflict was the 
solidifying of the 'War of Choice' idea which brought updated older concepts of a multi-tiered 
alliance, and had very different outcomes for each of our states. The intervention in Libya, itself 
as relatively uncomplicated and as the aftermath is complex and fractious, will be considered 
last. 
Finally, it is hoped that through the process of enlargement, beginning as it did from the 
restatement of the Article X obligations in the 'Message from Turnberry' of June 1990, will 
provide the clearest example of how small states can influence NATO policy – particularly with 
reference to the Baltic States, which were somewhat nurtured into post-communist life by 
Denmark, and to a lesser extent, Norway. Firstly, considering the events leading up to the 
Madrid summit of 1997, where the 'Visegrad' group were accepted, a decision that particularly 
disappointed two of the states examined, for entirely different reasons. The next two rounds of 
enlargement were relatively straightforward, even if they did bring in states that had previously 
been in indirect conflict with the alliance, and this is a process which will contrast sharply with 
the third and final section that will examine the more recent questions around how far NATO 
membership can actually be extended. Throughout this final chapter, it will be important to 
understand the ‘value added’ that small states can bring to the alliance, in a diplomatic sense, 
and how they make the most of changing circumstances that bring their own self-interests more 
broadly in line with those of NATO as a whole. 
NATO enlargement is potentially the biggest test of the 'norm entrepreneur' aspects of the 
foreign policy of these small states. As Thomas Risse Kappen noted in 1995 ‘NATO constitutes a 
community of liberal democracies that has deeply affected the collective identity of all 
members, including the United States . If there are to be any 'soft' benefits to the 'hard' 37
commitments made by these states, then retaining the democratic nature of the alliance should 
be central to how Denmark, Netherlands and Norway interact with it.   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Chapter 1 : Capabilities 

 After considering the institutional backdrop, we will consider each of the three states 
individually, the only time that this will be done. While this study specifically considers the 
post-Cold War period, it is important to begin with a brief historical outline of each state, before 
and during the Cold War, before moving on to discuss their hard-power capabilities. This is 
history, and not defence studies, so it is important not to spend too much time discussing 
financial figures or force structure diagrams – nonetheless these capabilities, and more 
fundamentally why the states have them, and what they intend to use them for, are crucial for 
understanding the central question about how these small states carry themselves 
internationally.  
The lesson from the Cold War, according to Ringsmose (2009), is that small states and 
capabilities do not fit established realist models, especially when it comes to the ‘threat 
hypothesis’ – the balance of power theory whereby states in an alliance cooperate and 
strengthen their capabilities in the face of perceived threats from an external actor. This is 
because ‘Whether small allied states spend 2%, 5%, 10% or 15% of their GDP on defensive 
military measures only makes a diminutive difference in terms of security’ – military spending is 
in many ways a ‘waste of resources’ especially when faced with a much larger power. Instead, 
their security lay in the alliance, and in the capabilities of the larger states in that alliance – 
what Ringsmose calls the ‘security guarantee hypothesis’, and during the Cold War small NATO 
states consistently spent less on defence than their larger allies, and only increased that 
spending when they came under pressure from their allies, particularly the United States. 
However, if the end of the Cold War brought the end of that balance of power, it must also hold 
that Cold War balance of power theories would also need to be re-thought. And indeed, the 
end of the Cold War has resulted in a great opening of the ‘action space’ available to some 
small states in particular. As vague ‘risks’ replace the concrete ‘threats’  of the Cold War, as 38
‘Wars of choice’ replace ‘Wars of necessity’ , and most importantly for this study, capability 39
‘outputs’ gain importance with regard to simple financial ‘inputs’ , the opportunity emerges for 40
small states to use their own strategic cultures to exploit the new system. The NATO strategic 
concepts studied in the previous section present a roadmap, which each state must decide to 
use in the way which best suits them, and many have, to great effect, and many small states 
would find themselves in the top half of a ‘two-tier’ NATO, were it to exist: something which 
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has been noticed by Jean-Marc Rickli in his study of small states’ military policies after the Cold 
War - his 'niche' capabilities are a physical 'smart state' strategy.  
In considering the ‘capabilities’ of these small states, it is from Rickli that will borrow concepts: 
he divides ‘military policy’ four ways:  the military aspects of security policy; military doctrines; 
force structure; and operational deployments. The final aspect will be considered in the next 
chapter, but the first three will be examined here. Treating these three elements, and examining 
them alongside general trends in military policy, with the various reviews, reforms, Acts of 
Parliament and spending budgets will allow us insight into how these small states approach 
something that they may previously have considered a ‘waste of resources’. The capabilities of 
all states, large and small, have fundamentally changed over this period, and some better than 
others, so it is therefore important to discover  where the three states in this study lie: Have they 
tailored their capabilities towards maximising influence? How have they done this? And, to 
bring it back to the central question of this study, how do these capabilities-based decisions 
reflect on each state’s strategic culture? 
As was remarked upon during the general introduction, the most remarkable thing about 
NATO’s transformation from a static, defensive formation into a flexible, expeditionary one is 
that it came at a time when defence spending among most of the states had been falling 
consistently. This is not necessarily sustainable, and so it is important to find examples of best 
practice, especially if NATO does indeed continue to ‘go further, fight harder, stand tougher and 
stay longer’ . 41

NATO 

Beginning an examination of our three states with a brief examination of the three NATO 
strategic concepts is a good introduction not only to the evolution of the alliance and the states 
with regards to military capabilities: it also acts as a good introduction to the constantly 
evolving strategic environment of the post-Cold War era, and allows for some examination. Not 
only because three is the magic number, the three Strategic Concepts will be examined in three 
ways: in the evolving strategic context that NATO found itself to be in; the objectives which it 
sets itself and its members; and finally the defence guidelines issued. 
The 1991 Strategic Concept , launched at the summit in Rome, was principally remarkable for 42
being the first one to be made public - even as the Soviet Bloc still stood (technically) intact. It 
must also be commended that a document written with the backdrop of such sustained seismic 
strategic activity, as this Bloc crumbled almost unexpectedly, could be so sure of itself - and not 
entirely wrong, even with the benefit of hindsight. 
While it was glad to announce that 'the threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of 
NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for 
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Allied strategy', this change in European order had brought about new 'multi-faceted’, 
‘multidirectional' (although notably unnamed) threats - there were obvious opportunities as 
well. 'The opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater 
than ever before' it trumpeted - but the focus had also switched geographically as well, which 
would be of interest to our three states. 'Ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes', alongside the 
challenge of ensuring the success of these nascent democracies was shifting the focus of NATO 
attention away from more northerly areas, firmly into Central and Eastern Europe, which is 
mentioned various times in the document. This brings about with it a 'greater risk of different 
crises arising': yet despite these changes, it was happy to announce that 'NATO's essential 
purpose', and the thrust of the Washington Treaty 'remains unchanged'. 
Borrowing the principle of 'One Europe, Whole and Free' from the Charter of Paris signed the 
previous year, the alliance sought to build on that type of dialogue, not only with the CSCE 
which had drawn up the charter, but also the WEU, and the EU, whose Common Security and 
Defence Policy would be unveiled the following year in Maastricht. Organisations such as 
these, which shared common values with NATO, would be vital the second big objective of the 
1991 document: crisis prevention. 'The potential of dialogue and co-operation within all of 
Europe must be fully developed in order to help to defuse crises and to prevent conflicts', a 
noble aim that was realised rather too late for some in the former Yugoslavia. 
Dialogue with the EU, and the potential of ESDP, was obviously a factor in stating that 
'the European members of the Alliance will assume a greater degree of the responsibility for the 
defence of Europe', an understandable aim that continues to be a bone of contention in the 
Atlantic alliance. This was a precursor to the admission that the new, favourable strategic 
context meant an inevitable reduction in the size and readiness of the forces bases in Europe - 
although 'to ensure that at this reduced level the Allies' forces can play an effective role both in 
managing crises and in countering aggression against any Ally, they will require enhanced 
flexibility and mobility': a flexibility and mobility that would become a buzz-word in the new 
NATO. 
The eight years which passed between the 1991 and 99  strategic concepts could be seen as 43
something of a high point for NATO: the eventual resolution of the Bosnian question had seen 
an organisation previously unsure of its continuing role justify its legitimacy: and as the second 
publically-available concept was unveiled at a 50th-anniversary conference in Washington, 
NATO was in the middle of a largely successful campaign to resolve the conflict in Kosovo - the 
very place where it can be argued that Slobodan Milosević had allowed the first rocks to be 
thrown in the breakup of Yugoslavia .  44
That the Yugoslav wars were the only real bloodletting after 1989 is also testament to a 
successful initial phase of post-Communist transition, to which NATO can claim to have played 
some part: a new European order was emerging, one which saw the Atlantic alliance as the 
only real alternative to the emergent democracies - their former guarantor, Russia, was still 
struggling with its own transition, and even it could talk of nothing more than partnership and 
dialogue with its erstwhile foe, an uncharacteristically meek position that would reach its low 
point the following summer when Russia was forced to seek the aid of NATO states, including 
Norway and the Netherlands,  to raise the wreck of the Kursk. There may have been Russian 
grumblings about the four 'Visegrad' states who joined NATO at the same Washington 
conference, but there was no alternative: 'A new Europe of greater integration is emerging, and 
a Euro-Atlantic security structure is evolving in which NATO plays a central part' 
                                                                       15
 NATO (1999)43
 Glenny, Loc. 1276944
The eastwards expansion and the continuing of the ESDP process had changed European 
defence, and made many feel safer, but it was also noted that this did not mean all threats were 
eliminated : the Kosovo crisis was one indicator of 'regional crises at the periphery of the 
Alliance, which could evolve rapidly', with the levelling of Grozny another lesson that post-
communist transition also meant in some parts the settling of grievances that most in the West 
didn't even know existed. Another threat was technology: as the threat of nuclear war on the 
Indian subcontinent loomed large, it was now clear that the power to alter world events did not 
lie solely in the hands of the five UN Security Council members: and threats like these did not 
come only from states. Unlike in previous SC, 'terrorism, sabotage and organised crime' were 
added to the list of 'known knowns'. 
Nonetheless, this was a time of plenty, and we are now given a real sense of how the objectives 
of the alliance had changed from a purely defensive posture towards one built on shared 
security through shared values. Expansion was to continue, and 'no European democratic 
country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from 
consideration', with Ukraine mentioned explicitly as being eligible. While there was some 
mention of 'common values' in the previous SC, phrases such as this and 'common 
commitment to democracy' spelt out that NATO was not simply an iron fist - even short of 
membership, there was a commitment to 'deepen partnerships' with, amongst other states and 
institutions, Russia. This was not to say that this was simply a manifesto with institutional aims: 
the previous commitment to develop crisis-management capabilities had developed, with an 
acknowledgement of the Bosnia inspired 1994 Brussels offer to consider this and also conflict 
prevention assistance on a 'case-by-case' basis. Such non-Article V missions could be in 
conjunction with other organisations, such as the UN or with PfP partners, if needs be, and for 
the first time the tantalising prospect of out-of-area missions is raised - as the concept argues for 
forces that are able to respond quickly to 'conduct crisis response operations...distant from their 
home stations, including beyond the Allies' territory'. 
The shift towards these types of operations had had an effect on the size, distribution and mix of 
forces deployed, as predicted in 1991. While numbers had decreased, and would continue to 
do so, it was seen as important to state that 'The Alliance will maintain the necessary military 
capabilities to accomplish the full range of NATO's missions' - and the key to this was seen as 
making sure it was a collective effort. Whether it be 'training and exercises, interoperability, 
civil-military relations, concept and doctrine development, defence planning, crisis 
management, proliferation issues, armaments cooperation as well as participation in 
operational planning and operations' the very existence of NATO offered an economy of scale 
from which member states could make savings. These savings were possible because 'the 
overall size of the Allies' forces will be kept at the lowest levels consistent with the 
requirements of collective defence and other Alliance missions', although developments in the 
years between this SC and the next one may indicate that this was advice followed rather too 
closely by many. 
While absolute numbers were dropping, the composition would have find an 'optimum 
balance' between the more familiar, static defensive forces, and the newer style flexible 
response type of formations that would be capable of undertaking these new types of missions. 
Such kinetic missions require a 'high degree of deployability, mobility and flexibility' which 
would see a new NATO 'rely increasingly on multinational forces'. This would continue on the 
template of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) that would allow smaller member states, and 
also those less willing ones, a chance to contribute. 
It would be eleven tumultuous, and probably less uniformly successful, years before NATO 
would publish the next strategic concept . The tumult had many stayed out of the home area 45
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though, as the report was happy to announce that 'the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the 
threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low. That is an historic success for the 
policies of robust defence, Euro-Atlantic integration and active partnership'. This back-slapping 
did not mean that threats didn't exist: 'All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital 
communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and 
prosperity depend.' and the disruption of these networks posed a principle threat to all states in 
an interdependent, polycentric structure. More conventional threats, such as the proliferation of 
ballistic missiles outside the Euro Atlantic area, echoing the prediction from the previous SC 
that weapons capabilities and technologies were spreading, were not to be ignored. And there 
was also the return of a Russia: 'NATO poses no threat to Russia' - a statement that, along with 
pleas for greater transparency and cooperation from Moscow indicated that NATO was itself 
beginning to feel threatened by Russia, especially in the wake of the South Ossetian conflict. 
NATO did seem distinctly more at ease with itself and its remit however: the 2010 SC 'commits 
the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilise post-conflict situations' in the third 
paragraph, a slick distillation of ideas which had been only vaguely present in 1991 - the 
alliance had moved far beyond simple Collective Defence. These crisis management skills, 
honed over 20 years of conflicts in and out-of-area, were further broken down: 'The lessons 
learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it 
clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective 
crisis management.' Later in the report we are given a breakdown of how NATO should 
organise the non-military aspects of this objective, an approach which is light years ahead of 
the casual references to such capabilities in previous concepts - and even though the evidence 
of more contemporary missions would indicate that it is still a work in progress, civilian and 
political planning is now firmly embedded in the NATO psyche. 
Such realisations that conflicts are not won by military means alone seeped into other 
objectives from 2011. Partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia, and the final integration of 
Western Balkan states into the Euro-Atlantic structure 'with the aim to ensure lasting peace and 
stability based on democratic values' are proposed, and it is these values that are seen as key. 
The 2011 SC finishes with 'Our Alliance thrives as a source of hope because it is based on 
common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law', a fitting 
conclusion to a text which was awash with many lofty statements on the values which allowed 
a Cold War defensive formation persist into the 21st century. That did not mean that the military 
message was diluted however: again we see a more refined message, bringing together 
previously disparate aims to form a more coherent narrative. NATO, it states, should 'maintain 
the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for 
collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance'. The message was 
succinct - but the key word was at the start of the sentence , for just as the objectives of the 
2011 SC saw values come to the fore, so did maintenance of capabilities in the defence 
guidelines. 
The anticipation that spending would decline in 1991 had been replaced by concern about just 
how far that would go. We will see later in this chapter how it affected individual states, but 
such a decline in defence spending was not ideal for maintaining the stated aim of conducting 
concurrent operations - never mind while continuing to modernise and reform the forces which 
would carry them out. As in the previous SC, it was stated that the Alliance sought the lowest 
possible level of forces for these missions, but that is obviously an ongoing and tricky 
calculation to make, especially when there are new demands being made for force evolution, 
for example in the case of cyber warfare. 
There is even mention of taxpayer value in the document - an idea that would probably not 
have existed in the days of classified Strategic Concepts, and existential threats from the Soviet 
Union, and one which would eventually evolve into a more solid concept known as ‘smart 
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defence’– whereby allies would cooperate in developing, acquiring, operating and maintaining 
capabilities . Such a change allows us to consider the evolution of NATO policy over the post-46
Cold War period: 1991's commitment to the original values of the Washington Treaty has been 
upheld, the states party to it increased; yet timid acceptance that the alliance may have to move 
beyond non article V mission into 'crisis prevention' in 1991 had evolved into 'case-by-case' 
conflict managements by 1999, and finally a confident, fully formed, ready-to-lead objective by 
2010.  
Acceptance of NATO as a defensive grouping had evolved in military terms into an 
expeditionary one, and its values too were for export: again initially timidly, but by the end of 
the period in a confidently stated manner - 'Our Alliance thrives as a source of hope because it 
is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law'. 
This was the face NATO was wanting the world to see - how its member states would interpret 
that is of course something else. 
Denmark: From Footnote to Impeccable Ally 

Prominent Danish Political Scientist Hans Mouritzen has a theory about history and its 
implications for foreign and security policy: 'foreign and security policy is mainly conditioned 
by 'present and past geopolitics', i.e. contemporary geopolitical circumstances and historical 
geopolitical lessons (war or occupation in particular). Its main assumption is that present 
geopolitics has primacy in relation to that of the past, but that past geopolitics may play a role, 
when present geopolitics allows a favourable action space.'  Denmark may be the state that 47
proves this theory, in that it may be difficult to find another (non-Post-Communist) European 
state which has used a present favourable action space alongside its own geopolitical history to 
forge such a striking geopolitical path. 
To find Denmark on such a sure geostrategic footing, it is necessary to go as far back as 1720, 
and the treaty of Fredricksborg signed with Sweden, ending the Great Northern War, and with it 
Swedish designs on the Baltic . This ushered in a period of peace and prosperity which was 48
abruptly ended by the disastrous decision to align with the wrong side in the Napoleonic Wars - 
Norway was lost to Sweden, and a rot set in that would see what had once been an Empire on 
four continents slowly break up . Worse was to follow: the answer to the famously intractable 49
Schleswig-Holstein question was Denmark losing another chunk of territory to an ascendant 
neighbour, in this case Prussia. This gave birth to the '1864 syndrome' , and the belief that 50
Denmark no longer drew any water on the international stage. 
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This retreat into 'defenceless neutrality' was best described by a much quoted phrase in the 
literature - 'What's the Use of It? '  asked a Liberal Danish statesman with regard to Danish 51
Armed Forces. In this period, Denmark did its very best to adopt a classic 'hiding' strategy, 
successfully avoiding entanglement in the Great War by mining the approaches to the Baltic to 
persuade both sides that there was no strategic benefit to invasion . In common with its Nordic 52
neighbours, it was an enthusiastic member of the League of Nations, but the failure of that 
organisation prefaced the ultimate failure of Danish neutrality, and a German invasion it had 
trying to avoid for almost 80 years - although it continued its own official neutrality even 
through the occupation . 53

NATO membership was not as simple a proposition in Denmark as elsewhere, and a mooted 
Scandinavian Defence Association was the preferred option until a mixture of Swedish non-
alignment, communist coups in Czechoslovakia, increasing pressure on Finland and  the 'never 
another 9th of April' sentiment forced the Danes to accept the lesser of two evils. It adopted a 
policy of 'adaption and screening' , integrating into the military structures where necessary, 54
but also making themselves awkward almost immediately through a series of disagreements 
over Greek and Turkish entry, spending and nuclear policy - and they also managed to obtain 
minor concessions to allow West German entry in 1955 . 55

The 'Danish problem' of the early NATO period was probably best encapsulated in the fact that 
it was the only allied state not to send military support for the Korean War - deciding to send 
only a hospital ship  - but the Danes were convinced that their 'Greenland card' should count 56
as a NATO 'input' , as the 1956 agreement gave the United States affective carte blanche over 57
the territory, in contrast to list of caveats on NATO activity on continental Denmark. This 
somewhat detached membership made Ostpolitik a perfect fit, and it was in this role that they 
made some peace with NATO membership around the 1969 20th anniversary - Denmark 
authored (with Norway) the early drafts of the Harmel Doctrine , and was active, from the 58
start, in groups like the CSCE and the 'Group of 10', a collection of smaller NATO and Warsaw 
Pact states which preceded it. Further favour was found with EC membership in 1973, and a 
commitment to buy F16s in 1976, in the face of heightened tension with Baltic neighbours . 59
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The relative calm did not last the decade though - around the time his Government was making 
a formal reservation about a requested 3% rise in defence expenditure, Prime Minister Anker 
Jørgenson was describing the neutron bomb as 'the devil's work' . This was a prescript into the 60
most difficult period of Denmark's NATO membership. The following year, a Danish 'wait-a-
moment' request to postpone the Dual-Track process was snubbed by the other member 
states , and the US Secretary of Defence began to talk of the dangers of the spread of this 61
'Denmarkisation'. Most damagingly, the tradition of consensus on foreign policy matters in the 
Folketing was torn asunder, as the leftist parties broke away to form an 'alternative majority'. 
While also seeking to strengthen ties with other social democratic parties in neighbouring states 
through the so-called 'Scandilux' network , this 'alternative majority' most damagingly forced 62
the incumbent government to register reservations, or 'footnotes' in a total of 23 NATO 
agreements , an undermining which was tolerated until it could finally be confident of winning 63
an election, which it did in 1988. 
It is in this long context of ‘reluctant alliance’  that makes the decision to send a Danish 64
corvette  to assist the coalition efforts in the first Gulf War all the more remarkable. The 65
disintegration of the communist system had radically changed Denmark’s outlook – it was now 
in a position of ‘unprecedented security’ , and there was genuine hope that the UN would be 66
empowered as Copenhagen’s policy makers had long wished. This systemic change, and the 
attendant new action space was acknowledged from the very start in Government documents, 
mirroring the NATO Strategic Concepts – and there was more to come. Defeat, by the slimmest 
of margins (0.7%) in a referendum on the Maastricht treaty  forced the government to 67
withdraw from the European Common Foreign and Security Policy – pushing it towards NATO 
as the sole outlet for security. Obviously this could not have been at a more important time, as 
experiences with the UN in Bosnia, where a Danish unit fought a tank battle with Serb forces , 68
was changing Danish attitudes to security policy – force was becoming useful for maybe the 
first time in 150 years. It became apparent over the period that the hitherto mentioned change 
from ‘threats’ to ‘risks’ and the switch from territorial defence to expeditionary capacity was 
fundamentally altering the nature of combat, even as Denmark began to acquire ‘enemies’  at 69
the turn of the century. 
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This new policy was ‘active internationalism’ , taking 'norm entrepreneurship' onto a new 70
level, was pioneered by a cross party group of policy-makers who were keen to ‘restore 
Denmark’s ruined credibility as an ally and partner in international cooperation ’, in the words 71
of Liberal Foreign Minister Uffe Elleman-Jansen. While it may seem to be a sea-change from 
Cold War positions, it can also be viewed as a more subtle binding of previously divergent 
strands of Danish policy: strands which had been ‘compartmentalised ’ in the Cold War, 72
meaning different expectations of cooperation in foreign affairs with Scandinavia, Europe, 
NATO or the UN. Now Denmark could reasonably consider bringing its values to the world – 
and while ‘active internationalism’ was a principally humanitarian concept, the military aspect 
was implicit: Denmark was now willing to act: ‘If we are not ready actively to defend these 
values, we undermine our own security in the long run. War and peace are no longer a question 
of defending Denmark’s borders. If stability in Europe is to be made secure – and that goes 
without saying – we have to do our part’ . So spoke FM Jensen before committing troops to the 73
UN mission in the Balkans in 1992. In the security context, Maastricht exemptions had pushed 
Denmark down a ‘mainstream Atlanticist’ route in NATO, but from these tentative beginnings in 
the early 90s, a ‘super Atlanticism ’ would evolve, as we will see in the next chapter. 74
At this early stage of the post-Cold War era, Denmark was actively supporting projects like the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP), and being an enthusiastic supporter of the Petersburg tasks. It was 
also willing to support its rhetoric with actions, for example suspending PfP cooperation with 
Russia in 1993 over the conflict in Chechnya . From 1988, and its first use by Jensen, until the 75
present day, ‘active internationalism’ has defined Danish strategic culture, and it will into the 
future, with the 2008 Danish Defence Review predicting ‘long term military operations in the 
future will be the rule rather than the exception’, a situation it sees continuing until at least 
2025. 
The literature on Danish security policy is awash with references to the change in tack, with 
journal papers titled ‘Paradise to Power’ or ‘Venus to Mars’ typical – it is now also possible to 
talk of the ‘Danish Way of War’. This doctrine, according to Jakobsen & Møller, is based on five 
principle: Firstly, the most important outcome in a Danish intervention may not always be 
victory, but the perception that Denmark is seen as a ‘good ally’. Logic dictates that a state the 
size of Denmark cannot hope to lead major operations, so they are deployed with a minimum 
of caveats and told to cooperate with their superiors, following ‘plug and play’ principles . 76
Secondly, as befitting a ‘norm entrepreneur’, promoting UN norms and principles is at the 
forefront of any deployment, preferably with a mandate – something which was originally an 
imperative before being removed at the time of the Kosovo conflict. The third principle was 
alluded to in the introduction in the form of parliamentary consensus, a long-standing principle 
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which had been lost in the ‘footnotes’ period – and was pushed to the limit again around the 
time of the controversial Iraq War, although a 2011 Social Democratic amendment now means 
a two-thirds majority is now needed . 77
A uniquely Danish doctrine is the ‘clean hands’ approach, which obligates Danish forces to 
avoid actions which may breach International Law, and necessitates allowing apprehension or 
interrogation of prisoners to be handled by local authorities or other alliance members – a 
policy consistent with the concessions noted in the first principle, but which may seem naïve. 
Finally, while NATO, as previously noted, adopted ideas of a ‘comprehensive approach’ into its 
later Strategic Concepts, Denmark has been following its own version for much longer. 
Eventually codified in the 2004 Defence Agreement as the Concerted Planning and Action, or 
CPA , it sought to pursue a liberal, democratic transition through a close military and civilian 78
cooperation. Such commitments, and the close proximity to NATO policy, led to Denmark 
being mooted as the smallest lead nation in a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 
Afghanistan, and although financial and personnel limitations meant this had to be refused, it 
shows the high regard in which this ‘Danish Way of War’ was held. 
A final note on the Danish military doctrine concerns the close attention paid to the welfare of 
active personnel: again, from the earliest post-Cold War Defence reviews, to the most recent, to 
where an entire chapter  was devoted to education, support and training for soldiers before 79
deployment, during it and into retirement – an emphasis on special capabilities which fits well 
into Rickli’s ‘niche’ thesis. 
The structure these well-trained and supported troops would be serving in can be seen as 
something of a new NATO model army. As early as 1994, a Danish International Brigade (DIB), 
had been formed to provide a fully-professional, rapidly-deployable ‘dual-assignment’ (UN and/
or NATO) expeditionary capacity of 4,500 troops, at a time when most of its allies could have 
seen to be simply ignoring the recommendations of the 1991 SC. From that moment on, there 
has been an unerring commitment to force modernisation, with even the DIB being seen as 
obsolete and replaced after the 2004 Danish Defence Agreement. Interoperability was always 
also seen as key in such a force, with the formation of the Multinational Corps-Northeast, 
alongside Germany and Poland in 1999 – even if certain aspects of common security taken up 
by the EU now suffer post-Maastricht. 
This 2004 agreement was the final recognition of that move from ‘Venus to Mars’, and gave the 
solid, capabilities commitments that made it a ‘role model within NATO ’. The headline focus 80
was on ‘deployability’ and anti-terrorism operations, with a noticeable commitment to maintain 
1,500 troops continuously deployed, while generously supported and regularly rotated – with a 
maximum projection of up to 5,000 troops for shorter periods . There was no direct 81
replacement for the DIB, but was an universal force commitment for external, expeditionary 
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operations, with the only territorial, Cold War hangover coming in the shape of a not yet fully 
professional Home Guard .  82
Such a commitment to a relatively new type of expeditionary warfare of unpredictable 
durability, with such an ambitious personnel target would inevitably lead to ‘wear-and-tear’ 
factors emerging – as was acknowledged . But the temptation to exploit this new-found focus 83
on output factors was too much, especially as the example set by the Strategic Concepts, or the 
Brussels and Riga summits was not being widely copied. An example of this would be the 
NATO ‘usability target’ for allied states, agreed at the 2004 Istanbul summit , in which states 84
would have 40% of their total force strength would be ‘structured, prepared and equipped’ on 
NATO lines, and that 8% of the total be deployed or immediately ready for deployment at any 
given moment . Denmark saw this ‘40/8’ target and placed its own ‘60/10’  marker ahead of 85 86
it – meaning the majority of Danish force strength be dedicated to NATO tasks, and 10% of it 
would be deployed at any given time. Such ambitions often run into a brick wall, and so it 
would happen in the Danish case – as it was forced to delay commitments to ISAF in 
Afghanistan while troops were redeployed from other operations in Kosovo and Iraq. 
This increasingly thin state of the Danish Armed Forces, spread over 70-odd conflicts that it had 
involved itself in since 1989, was a major theme of the 2008 Defence Commission. It started 
with a financial warning that ‘balancing the books…is not sustainable indefinitely’, and that the 
‘long-term, periodically high-intensive’ operations that were now the norm had put an 
unprecedented strain on equipment budgets, an fact that was supported by the 2010 SC. 
Despite, or maybe because of this, there was another evolution in the forces concept, with the 
emphasis on flexible, deployable, and now sturdy forces, capable of undertaking a new type of 
multi-layered deployment. Now as many as  2,000 continually deployed troops would be 
capable of undertaking a diverse range of tasks encompassing counter insurgency, armed 
conflict, stabilisation and policing  - a remarkable figure considering Germany could only 87
deploy around 7,000 troops, with a much larger population  This commitment to highly-88
trained, specialised forces, capable of doing ‘hard work ’fits the template provided by Rickli of 89
a state with ‘high strategic ambition’, pursuing ‘role specialisation’, and is consistent with a 
‘smart state’ strategy. The benefits flowing to Denmark from such ambitious commitments are 
uncertain, even for Danish political scientists and historians, but it does underline a conscious 
and long standing commitment to maximise influence within NATO. 
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By 2008, Denmark was the second highest per-capita contributor to NATO missions  - an 90
amazing turnaround in two decades that saw some, rather enthusiastically, offer it as an 
‘impeccable ally’ . Astonishingly, this had happened as Danish defence spending had fallen 91
well below expectations, and sat at only 1.4% of GDP in 2011 . While previously, this may 92
have been taken as par for the course, the new post-Cold War focus on outputs over inputs had 
presented an opportunity to blend a strategic culture based on active internationalism’ with a 
tireless search for the models and structures that could really deliver ‘more for less’. This relied 
heavily on political will being matched by a favourable action space, in complete contrast to 
what had gone before, but it remains nonetheless remarkable. 
Of course, ‘Denmark had to reorient its foreign policy one way or the other’  in order to avoid 93
‘influence marginalisation’  brought on by the loss of the ‘Greenland Card’, and the Maastricht 94
opt-outs only pushed it further towards NATO, but 20 years of this hard work, and the 
emergence of capabilities that have allowed Denmark to re-emerge as a strategic actor, have 
seen the ‘footnotes’ become a footnote and see Denmark emerge as a model for a new, more 
flexible, more sustainable and sturdier NATO – and an example to even its larger neighbours. 

Netherlands – One step forward, one step back 

There is a Napoleon quote which says that 'a country’s foreign policy is dictated by its 
geography' , which serves as a good introduction to the Netherlands, for two reasons: firstly, as 95
it was Napoleon who invaded and finally disabused the Dutch of their Great Power aspirations; 
and secondly because it is the lack of both natural resources or frontiers, and a famously flat 
landscape which have defined the Netherlands' relationship with world, particularly the three 
Great Powers which encircle it. 
Belgian revolution and separation pushed the new Kingdom of the Netherlands into a peculiar 
neutrality in the 19th and early 20th centuries - 'By oscillating amongst the British, French and 
Germans, the Dutch hoped to keep their national independence'  - and keep it they did: even 96
if the definition would be stretched during the First World War, all while maintaining an Empire 
in East Asia and the Caribbean. This exercise in diplomatic plate-spinning could not hope to 
survive Nazi aggression, and the years of occupation, with their small triumphs and dark 
secrets, was to prove transformational for Dutch neutrality.  
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It was quickly understood that there was only really one option for Dutch foreign policy: 'Dutch 
politicians displayed a remarkable readiness to leave the major responsibility for the defence of 
Western Europe to the USA and to trust the US President blindly' . And barring a minor hiccup 97
around the independence of the Dutch East Indies, they stayed true to this - happily bearing the 
attendant defence costs. The logic was that the US would act as an external balance to the 
continental powers, particularly France, with the upswing of an accommodating Netherlands 
gaining favourable status in Washington, and avoiding relegation to the 'third class' of states .  98
A neat 'division of labour' emerged between a European Union serving its economic interests, 
and NATO serving to ensure that it could continue with a sort of modified version of the pre-
War neutrality , still oscillating, but assured of its independence. This was a studied policy, not 99
simply dictated by realist expediencies, as a less Atlanticist, more conciliatory approach to the 
Soviet Union as practiced by its neighbour Germany may well have served better Dutch 
interests  - so it was a choice acknowledged and appreciated in Washington.  100
This loyalty was demonstrated in Dutch nuclear policy: from the advent of the Multi-Lateral 
Force (MLF), which was 'developed to provide Germany, and to some extent Italy, with a sense 
of equality with [the] atomic powers' , the Dutch held their nerve, and put alliance stability 101
ahead of self-interest and decided not to veto a plan what could see a certain diminution of 
Dutch influence -  although the MLF never actually came to fruition . There was also a Dutch 102
nuclear industry of economic and strategic advantage, which underlined an ambiguous nuclear 
policy in general, but this would soon change. The 1970s saw a 'domestication' of Dutch 
politics, as civil society organisations had sought to redress the post war 'blind' Atlanticism, 
particularly around nuclear weapons. However, while there were brief fears of 'Hollanditis' 
taking root, political will remained strong and 'strategic confidence' in the US rode out the 
Cold War .  103
And so, the end of the Cold War, while removing the threat of invasion over the North 
European Plain, did not present as massively changed 'action space' for Dutch foreign policy 
makers. The 'frantic weeks' of January 1990 also carried the unsettling thought of German 
unification upsetting Dutch attempts to 'anchor' its sometime nemesis in the Euro Atlantic 
project . There were other peculiarly Dutch problems: the larger Kingdom of the Netherlands 104
still meant the Dutch security space, and its resources, extended to the Caribbean , a place 105
where US security interests could be guaranteed, unlike in Europe. This Dutch 'influence 
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dilemma' emerged as cracks were showing in the 'division of labour' between NATO and the 
EU, hitherto handled by different government departments , and as competencies began to 106
slowly crossover in the new security climate, so did wires. Politically too, cracks emerged 
between a security-minded school of Dutch FSP, and a development-minded one, broadly (but 
not entirely) corresponding to right and left wing parties respectively.  
However, early prophesies from the frantic weeks, months and years of the Post-Cold War did 
not emerge, and the new order proved most convivial for a state with the 'legalistic' and 
'consensual' traditions of the Netherlands . Its action space is still dictated by geography, that 107
lack of resources still turning the Dutch to the sea and to trade: it is among the world’s top ten 
exporting countries , and 70% of its GDP is based on international commerce . These 108 109
traditions make the pursuit of 'active multilateralism' a natural aim of Dutch FSP, maintaining 
influence and continuing 500 years of 'mundialism' . 'The Netherlands is capable of 110
generating a big strategic picture, and a contribution to the allied effort' , abilities which they 111
have applied in the 22 years we are studying  - a fact that has not been lost on its most 
important ally, the United States .  112
A natural affinity with the Post-Cold War structure did not translate directly into a coherent 
doctrine, however. There emerged a general confusion over the exact direction of travel, with 
the armed forces torn between the demands of its allies, squabbling government departments, 
and the famous 'polder model' of politics which may be laudable in many respects, but is 
decidedly risk-averse . As previously noted European CDSP wasn't fully trusted, and 113
politicians and policy makers in The Hague were unsure of a more 'political' NATO .  114
Finally, the introduction of Article 100 of the constitution in 2000 saw a de facto need for 
parliamentary approval for troops on peacekeeping and peace-building operations . While the 115
increased democratic oversight is obviously desirable, it has manifested itself less desirably, as 
political expediences , populist parties, and bandwagons have sapped the previously strong 116
will of Dutch governments. Additionally, this has had knock on effects for the rules of 
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engagement for Dutch forces abroad, and issues have emerged over the deployability needed 
for a modern, flexible force, and expectations of partners in new multinational formations .  117
Despite this confusion, a 'Dutch approach' of sorts has developed. Beginning with the 1995 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MinBuZa) memo, a policy known as '3D' (Defence, Diplomacy and 
Development) took shape . Drawing on Dutch strengths, and the emerging concepts around 118
human security , the approach is best encapsulated a government catchphrase: 'as civilian as 119
possible, as military as necessary' . Here was an attempt to focus the various arms of Dutch 120
FSP into working together towards common goals, with the added bonus of learning new, 
transferrable skills. 
The initial application of the policy was in the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 
the Uruzgan province of Southern Afghanistan, (which we shall study later) and understandably 
it had some teething problems. It is a truism to say that the 'Ds' had 'different time horizons, 
different capacities and speeds, different directions and so on',  and were often hard to 121
manage as a cogent whole - but it maintained broad support, with even more critical voices (of 
which there were many) accepting that the principle remained sound, even an exact definition 
was 'difficult to pin down'. Not only does '3D' connect core Dutch strengths, both hard and 
soft, it provided the model for a continuing ability to provide 'framework' status in international 
operation, as it did in Uruzgan, or in UN operations in Eritrea . 122
The Dutch PRT in Uruzgan may be seen in coming years as something of a watershed in Dutch 
strategic culture. 3D was an example of modern, comprehensive defence planning that was 
mirrored in the structure of the Dutch forces that were deployed on the ground. The appearance 
of a modern force did not hide the strains on capabilities and equipment budgets for these 
forces, and it is these shortcomings that resonate most strongly: no matter how well the Ministry 
of Defence had played a bad hand, creating a ‘benchmark’ structure for NATO states according 
to some , the scale of the defence cuts since 1991 was still most newsworthy. 123
In 2008, the defence budget was the same in actual terms as that of 1990, and by 2011, the 
Netherlands had the 2nd smallest per capita defence budget in NATO:  was this trend to 
continue, they was on course to spend less than 1% of GDP on defence by the middle of the 
decade . A general decline in economic terms, coupled with the attendant loss in capabilities 124
and morale, was of course a problem shared by many NATO states, but there were also 
peculiarly Dutch problems: the additional strain of the €378 million annual budget of the 
Koninklijke Marechaussee , a gendarmerie-style unit mainly responsible for airports and other 125
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domestic security matters; or the continuing tensions between branches of the conventional 
armed forces, hindered rather than helped by the continuation of the ‘1:2:1 rule’ which keeps 
investment in the navy, army and air force within set ratios .  126
The long term nature of military planning and budgets does not sit well with political short 
termism, and the defence budget has often been easy meat for Finance Ministers – the arbitrary 
nature of the Dutch defence investment model has only thus exacerbated this, as long term 
projects, like the Joint Strike Fighter program to replace the F16 fighter jet have been caught up 
in a budget lag which has tripped up most who have tried to become involved . More general 127
problems, such as the ‘planning paradox’ which sees civil servants preparing for ‘fast in, fast 
out’ operations that are extended indefinitely, with the consequent shortfalls in equipment and 
materiel having to be made up by the MoD itself, made a defence budget like the one of 2008 
the ‘most brutal’ , with the irreversible loss of certain capabilities, such as a tank division – 128
the most prominent government advisory body on foreign and security matters described the 
continuation of such cuts as ‘irresponsible’, adding ‘no sensible person would respond to 
financial difficulties by cancelling his fire insurance’ .  129
The acknowledgement that these cuts may now have gone too far has led to many accentuating 
the negative, but the force transformation has been broadly successful. That the Netherlands is 
the ‘biggest of the small powers’ has been touched on in the introduction, but its unusual size 
left the 1990s Dutch armed forces with a toolbox that was ‘wide and shallow’ , with a range 130
of capabilities befitting a much larger power. The desire to keep some of these capabilities has 
pushed the Dutch into cooperation, with Belgium in naval matters, and with Germany, through 
the German/Dutch Corps, an initiative that dates back to 1993 – putting Dutch efforts in the 
vanguard of the new NATO, particularly in a ‘smart defence’ context, and going a long way to 
squaring the ‘Deployability vs Downsizing’ circle  .  131
The cuts, and the transformation began with the 1991 Defence White Paper, the motto of 
‘flexibility and mobility’ pointing in a modern direction, and the content laying foundations for 
a leaner, but tougher structure. The next major MoD contribution was the 1993 ‘Priorities 
Memo’, with threat-based planning replaced by a modern capabilities-based focus, a 
commitment to out of area operations, and an end to conscription – and the transformation 132
was completed with the 2000 White Paper which established the Armed Forces’ expeditionary 
character, and consigned the Cold War structure to history. The Dutch have also proved adept at 
strengthening the armed forces on an individual level, consistent with Rickli’s thesis: documents 
like the 2006 Militair-Strategische Verkenning provided a foundation for better-trained, 
supported and deployed soldiers, allowing the Dutch Armed Forces not only to participate in, 
but also to lead medium-scale operations: a ‘national ambition’ strengthened by the 
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commission in 2007 of the HNLMS Johan de Wit, an amphibious landing vessel essential for 
‘command and control’ abilities .  133
Of course, each of the documents mentioned above also contained a variety of cuts , and it is 134
these ‘tensions between ambition and capability’  that reveal the paradox in contemporary 135
Dutch strategic culture. Political short-termism, inter-service and inter-departmental rivalry, 
along with prevailing economic conditions have given the Dutch much reason to be 
pessimistic, but this often masks the strong foundations that have, almost against the odds, been 
built since 1991. These problems have ensured that the future Dutch role remains uncertain, 
but there are also indications, such as with ‘3D’, that the possibilities for increased ‘jointery’, 
and continued cooperation with fellow NATO states, exist – and while even this most outward 
looking and international of states may have to resist the temptation to keep its ‘head down’ in 
foreign policy terms, its own history gives much reason for renewed strategic confidence. 
Norway: Slowly but Surely 

The timeline for understanding the practice of Norwegian strategic culture is obviously 
somewhat shorter, given that it only achieved independence from more than 500 years of 
Danish, and then Swedish rule in 1905. It would be no surprise that neutrality would be a 
natural starting point for an independent Norway, whose first Foreign Minister described the 
two principle aims of Norwegian Foreign Policy as ‘to defend Norwegian economic interests, 
and to keep the country out of war between European powers.’   As with almost all neutral 136
states, the Second World War was not kind to that neutrality, with the Wehrmacht invasion of 
April 1940 just narrowly ahead of a British attempt to secure a vital beachhead into the Baltic. 
As elsewhere in Europe, the experiences of that conflict were paramount in choosing a way 
forward, and while Norway was interested in principle in a Scandinavian defence agreement, it 
was also adamant that this should include the United States, a position that was eventually 
shared by Denmark and Iceland . Some saw Norwegian entry as ‘NATO á la Carte’ , as it 137 138
reacted to Russian concerns by having caveats in its NATO policy regarding an absence of 
foreign bases on Norwegian territory, restrictions on exercises or bases in sensitive regions close 
to the Russian border, and eventually a complete ban on nuclear weapons . While this may 139
seem like a strange manifestation of alliance solidarity, it was just an example of ‘integration 
and shielding’ , the tactic of concomitantly dissuading Russian interference, while reassuring 140
Moscow that its intentions were peaceful: on closer examination there were caveats to the 
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Norwegian caveats, whereby all of these restrictions only applied in peacetime, with the 
obvious corollary that plans existed to change this posture if needs be - leading us to conclude 
that ‘Norwegian policy, with all its stated restraints, probably [fitted] US requirements quite 
well’ . 141
The United States certainly found Norway to be strategically useful because of its favourable 
location, and there was extensive intelligence cooperation throughout the Cold War , a 142
relationship that was probably smoothed by significant military aid, (until 1965 40% of 
Norwegian defence expenditures were effectively bankrolled by the US)  but Oslo was happy 143
to be part of this ‘alliance within an alliance’  which was of great reassurance for a state 144
geographically and politically on the European periphery. It was a cooperative member, 
chastising Denmark for low defence spending in the 1950s , and choosing to opt out of EC 145
membership in the 1970s , but also a ‘loyal critic’ , sharing its neighbour’s reservations on 146 147
many issues, though only registering one ‘official reservation’, around the Strategic Defence 
Initiative in 1986.  
In such a favourable context, in the Post-Cold War, Norway was almost inevitably going to be 
disadvantaged. With a ‘doorstep’ that was entirely unchanged, it could be argued that instability 
in the new Russia would actually prove to be disadvantageous to the new Norwegian action 
space. Concerns were plentiful:  Norway no longer seemed to have a ‘free ticket’  to the 148
NATO inner circle, as a shift of focus from the High North towards the emergent states of 
Central and Eastern Europe led to the threat of marginalisation. As public support for NATO and 
Norway’s Atlantic identity actually rose in the early 1990s , and the European Union was 149
rejected for the second time, (although somewhat counter-intuitively, Norway takes part in EU 
CDSP formations that Denmark is constitutionally unable to) Norway’s greatest strategic interest 
became the need to keep Cold War NATO infrastructure and investment in Norway , resulting 150
in slowed reaction to the emerging structure. Additionally, while public support remained 
strong, amongst policy makers there emerged fears that American disengagement could render 
the vital security guarantee provided by Article V useless . 151
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Such attitudes persisted until relatively late into our period of study, but change did come. As 
fears of US disengagement failed to materialise, and the United Nations failed to develop as the 
strategic actor many Norwegians would have liked it to, the way it perceived this new security 
environment also changed. The emergence of the ‘wars of choice’ of the new millennium made 
them potential tools for those who chose to use them , something which was given even more 152
resonance as the economic crisis of 2008 removed the ability for many European states to make 
that choice. Additionally, increased Russian assertiveness brought the issue of the High North 
back to a degree of prominence, as previously ignored Norwegian concerns  began to gain 153
traction. While there were increased tensions with Moscow, the two states were able to reach 
an agreement over the hitherto intractable problem of the Barents Sea area, with its huge oil 
and gas potential .  Almost as if it has come full-circle, Norway has again been able to assert 154
its credentials as a reliable, and useful, ally, and ‘transatlantic bridge-builder’ . 155
The Norway of 2011, in the aftermath of its contribution to the Libyan campaign had eventually 
come round to adopting a more proactive version of mainstream NATO military doctrine, 
something that had led to praise from the US, as we saw in the introduction, and a general 
feeling that Norway had joined Denmark in the 'top tier'. This conversion to the NATO way of 
war was achieved without any real attempt to find a uniquely Norwegian doctrine, beyond 
general 'human security' concepts, although there was a brief attempt to push Arctic-trained 
Norwegian troops as perfectly suited to the rigours of the Afghan winter . What was more 156
significant was the idea that Norwegian 'defence identity' could be a useful tool for foreign and 
security policy itself, and that there was not necessarily any conflict between the humanitarian 
aspects of Norwegian policy, and the more self-interested need to be seen as a good ally - 
although tensions between the two still exist=.  
This was a stark contrast to what had happened before. It would be as late as the turn of the 
century when Norway finally abandoned its Cold War ideas of territorial defence, and begin 
moving towards a modern, expeditionary force . There were other reasons behind this, 157
besides the previously noted security environment. Norwegian regard for the UN as a security 
actor was slow to wane, which spoke much to a deep-seated wish to be seen as a peace-loving 
nation with a high sense of moral purpose – ‘we are a peaceful and cooperative people’ . The 158
Norwegian Armed Forces were seen as a sort of extension of this, and through conscription 
achieved the status as a 'nation building'  force which was in 'no rush' to change .  159 160
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It was also in no rush to change a force structure which was almost entirely territorial, with 
planning for a full-frontal Russian assault featuring in defence concepts until as late as 1998 . 161
While as early as 1993, the expeditionary 'Telemark' battalion had been formed , this was still 162
very much with UN operations in mind. As noted above, the 'nation building' instinct of the 
Armed Forces was strong, and it also had a physical dimension, as resources and manpower 
were evenly spread over the vast Norwegian territory in a deliberate attempt to use the military 
as tool of government 'district policy' aimed at supporting rural communities . Inevitably, 163
downsizing was met with considerable opposition from those unconvinced that the shift from 
'quantity to quality' was really in their interest . It would take the failure of the outdated 164
structure to deliver results in Kosovo for change to be instigated. 
This break from 50 years of 'people's defence' from 2000 onwards has created a mainstream, 
modern and flexible force , albeit one that is far from the top of the class. There is one thing 165
which distinguishes Norway however: 'Nervos belli, pecuniam infinitam' reads the Cicero 
quote, and Norway's oil and gas reserves, and its control of the world's largest sovereign wealth 
fund , have bequeathed an ability to make procurement decisions that are the envy of other 166
European states. Twice as large as that of Denmark or Finland, and significantly larger than 
neighbouring Sweden   Norway's defence budget even took advantage of the economic crisis, 167
rising in 2009 ,as most others were being slashed drastically. This has given the Ministry of 168
Defence the ability to make procurement decisions, like the purchase of the five Fridtjof 
Nansen-class frigates between 2004-11, that go against NATO counsel , because they would 169
be significantly underused; or go through the project proposal for the new F35 Joint Strike 
Fighter, which caused so much controversy elsewhere, with a minimum of fuss. Even if 
Norwegian defence expenditure still falls (just) short of the 2% target, Norwegian Kroners will 
continue to go further than non petro-currencies for the foreseeable future.  
The general shift from threat to risk-based capabilities planning did not necessarily apply to 
Norway, and for a time it appeared to be left behind on NATO's 'forgotten flank' . For much 170
of the period Norwegian behaviour could be seen to be that of an 'ambivalent ally' , unsure 171
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of what the 21st century NATO could offer it. But eventually, the deep seated Atlanticist 
worldview reasserted itself it seems as if Norway has found a place for itself again.  
'The evolving nature of conflict presents opportunities for Davids to fight alongside Goliaths, if 
they bring the right slingshot.'  Winning the natural resource lottery has given Norway the 172
ability to acquire a variety of slingshots, and the possibility of joining coalitions of the willing 
(and able) with less risk of economic sacrifice  having to be made domestically. Finally, 173
aligning its alliance responsibilities with traditional Norwegian regard for its moral obligations 
has given rise to an idea that Norway is quietly happy to measure the influence its wields 
through the esteem in which its allies hold it . 174

     * * * 

Analysing a state’s capabilities, first by considering its security environment, then the force 
structures and doctrines it adopts in relation to that, are the most reliable method of 
understanding where it sees itself in the world. States with low, or limited, strategic ambitions 
would not have made the same choices as the three states we are studying: all have – to a 
strikingly similar degree, albeit at different speeds – tailored their military capabilities towards a 
NATO ideal, seeking to maximise their influence, and refuting Ringsmose’s hypothesis about 
small state military spending being a ‘waste of resources’, as Military Policy becomes very 
much part of a broader Foreign Policy, and becomes part of a broader strategic culture. 
In line with Rickli too, their modern, flexible and well-trained troops are able to provide a 
useful niche for NATO missions, something we shall examine in more detail in the next chapter, 
and particularly in the case of Denmark and the Netherlands, their increasingly sophisticated 
military doctrines allow more fundamental, national values around human security and liberal 
democracy to be applied, and even exported in a classic norm entrepreneur fashion, as we will 
see in the last two chapters. 
How was this achieved? While Norway proved initially resistant, Denmark and the Netherlands 
embraced the new Post-Cold War security environment to totally restructure a principally 
territorial force into a model NATO, expeditionary one. As we have seen, there have been 
challenges - shared by all, principally around materiel and procurement budgets – but the 
Netherlands led the way in joint procurement with neighbours, and Denmark pushed NATO 
targets to the limit, and even passed them, with the 60/10 commitment.   
In doing so, they provide a valuable template for NATO states, small and large, looking to 
square the circle of increasing ‘outputs’ in the face of declining ‘inputs’, and moving towards 
‘smart defence’ principles. An early example of a state copying this was of course Norway, 
which finally modified the Cold War ‘nation building’ culture of its own armed forces to mirror 
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the new template, a decision  which allowed for more influence in NATO, as we will see later o 
n.  
As NATO became more sure of itself towards the end of our period, so did Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Norway. Each has, in an individual way, had to adapt, and make difficult 
choices about how its strategic interests are best served – particularly in regards to the decline 
of the UN as a security actor – but each has found an enhanced role in the new NATO. 
Whether it be the Dutch ability to provide a ‘big picture’, or the Danish epiphany over ‘active 
internationalism’ being well served through the aegis of NATO, these smart states, and their 
much larger allies have found the relationship to be mutually beneficial.  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Chapter 2 : Conflict 

 And so we move on to analyse the final aspect of these small states' military doctrines, 
as per Rickli: that of operational deployments. In the introduction, we defined 'smallness' in a 
relational context and in the first chapter then discovered that the capabilities these small states 
possess are not always insignificant. In this second chapter, we will examine the power these 
states exercise. Armed force is an acknowledged and much-studied instrument of foreign and 
security policy for large states, but one which remains almost as unknown from the small state 
perspective as a decade ago, when de Wijk (2004) tried to put that perspective into a broader 
NATO context.  
That broader NATO context is one which has evolved somewhat during our period, as the 'wars 
of necessity', framed in the context of avoiding humanitarian catastrophe in the 1990s, have 
been replaced by the 'wars of choice' that came after, a concept best articulated by Richard 
Haass' 2009 book ‘War of Necessity, War of Choice', although this was resolutely form the 
large state perspective.  Backlighting this more expeditionary NATO has been the decline of the 
United Nations as a security actor, although it has continued to be the legitimiser for states 
which put a premium on their obedience to International Law.  
But this also applies to small states, and they have also begun to view armed force as just 
another 'tool' in their own strategic culture 'toolbox' , an idea that has been examined from 175
an individual perspective, but rarely from more general small state point of view. Over the 
period, they have realised the power they exercise, while rarely being key to the success of an 
individual operation, can be in the national political interest, and give tangible benefits to their 
perception. Especially in the context of 'two-tier' alliance, small states can impress by doing 
things that much larger, more capable states won't. This 'willingness'  to do the heavy lifting 176
for NATO can even be seen to be an integral part of the strategic culture of these states , and a 177
tangible effort to compensate for what Rickli called 'power deficit' - and is an obvious example 
of a 'smart state' strategy in their FSP. 
In this chapter, unlike the previous, we will consider Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway 
collectively, through four prominent NATO operations, starting in Bosnia and ending in Libya, 
to try an determine what general trends can be determined from small states over this period. 
Looking at the most relevant deployments; the perceptions and performances on that 
deployment; and finally the perceived benefits or problems that these deployments brought, 
will allow us to get a better idea as to what motivates these states to go to war, risking the lives 
of their citizens, when their participation in that conflict will not necessarily be the difference 
between success and failure (such as success and failure can be measured in the new 
asymmetric and ill-defined forms of conflict).  
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The theoretical basis will come again from Rickli, as it is important to understand how these 
states brought the niche capabilities they had developed to bear on their contribution to foreign 
deployments. In addition, to understand the perceptions and outcomes of these deployments, 
we will borrow from Ringsmose & Børgesen, who saw that niche capabilities were not the only 
determining factor in a successful mission: ‘military capabilities and political resolve are the 
two fundamental ingredients in any combatant’s war-fighting potential.’  178
Persuading publics unused to foreign intervention, who often had distinctly non-interventionist 
ideas of what constituted security policy, required governments to create strategic narratives that 
justified their actions. Quoting Morgenthau ‘that public opinion is not a static thing to be 
discovered and classified by public opinion polls as plants are by botanists, but that it is a 
dynamic , ever changing entity to be continuously created and recreated’   - especially in the 179
face of potential human costs. To succeed, governments would have to find something that 
resonated with core values of their electorates  - even if that meant blurring the lines of what 
constituted promoting a peaceful world order; they would have to be clear in their aims, even if 
what constituted victory was not itself clear; and the would also have to be consistent, as the 
emergence of opposition and counter-narratives would not be kind to governments who could 
not justify the risks they were taking.   

Bosnia: Transformational Impotence 

To consider the events around the end of the Cold War from 1989-91, it is often easy to forget 
that there were other geo-political issues to be dealt with. One such was the first Gulf War, a 
conflict which took much of the attention of the larger NATO allies, and as we saw even 
Denmark contributed to the naval coalition, assisted by a smaller Norwegian coastguard 
vessel . Possibly because of the events in the Gulf, the first rumblings of discord in the 180
Western Balkans were largely ignored, even if the warnings were apocalyptic: we heard from 
the BBC that ‘The leaders of Yugoslavia are stirring a cauldron of blood that would soon boil 
over’ .  181
As the warnings intensified, and the first shots were fired, NATO was indecisive, pulled in 
different directions, and unsure as to what role, if any, the United States should play in solving a 
European problem . Early solutions offered by the international community were simply 182
sticking plasters in place of real, considered action in a region that had vexed Western policy 
makers since time immemorial, and NATO problems were intensified by the fact that members 
like Greece or Germany were compromised somewhat by their actions towards belligerents in 
the rapidly fragmenting Yugoslavia . 183
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The biggest plaster was UNPROFOR, created in February 1992 in order to create conditions for 
peace talks in both Croatia and Bosnia, but which was unable to do what many had hoped, 
from the start. ‘Outgunned, demoralised and subjected to the most inflexible bureaucracy in 
military history, this force became a convenient scapegoat for everybody’ .  UNPROFOR was 184
supported wholeheartedly by all of our states, all three hitherto active peacekeepers, all three 
hopeful, to differing degrees, that it was in conflicts like the one in Yugoslavia that the UN could 
make itself useful as a security actor in the Post-Cold War era – and it was through two key 
events during this deployment that the states began to realise that this might not be possible. 
While not connected directly to later NATO operations, the two examples are both key to 
understanding the evolution of strategic culture in both the Denmark and the Netherlands.  
Firstly, in April 1994, Danish forces close to Tuzla came under attack from Bosnian Serb 
positions . Despite the restrictive rules of engagement, the Danish commander retaliated, with 185
the first and only tank battle in Danish history, and the seventy-two rounds he fired were the 
first fired in anger since 1864 .The battle was won, but despite this, and other attacks from 186
Bosnian Serb units, the UN was either unwilling, or unable to change its stance, leading the 
battle commander to subsequently accuse the UN of endangering his men's lives . The result 187
was an enthusiastic public response, the commander becoming a media star, and the utility of 
force, for almost the first time, becoming clear to Danish policy makers . 188
Just over a year later, probably the darkest moment of the whole conflict occurred in the town 
of Srebrenica, at the time under the nominal control of a small Dutch force of peacekeepers. It 
was one of six such towns  which provided the only real UN guarantee towards the Bosniak 189
population, but as with the mission in general, this guarantee was not up to scratch. The facts, 
as they are, show that the Bosnian Serb forces entered Srebrenica on the 13th of July and 
methodically murdered 8,000 unarmed civilians over a period of days, before continuing the 
offensive with an attack on another safe haven . While the arguments over the conduct of the 190
Dutch command and forces in Srebrenica have been the subject of heated debate , they were 191
undoubtedly outnumbered by the Bosnian Serb forces, and repeated requests for assistance 
were turned down . The consequences for Dutch military policy were immediate and 192
sustained: causing ripples which brought down a government in 2002 , and as late as July 193
2014, Dutch courts were still trying to apportion blame. It also had ramifications for future 
Dutch deployments, and force structures, as in future missions air support for Dutch troops 
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would be provided by the Dutch Air Force – a commitment that would require sustained 
investment in that area . 194
More immediately, the horror of Srebrenica proved a galvanising force in NATO finally taking 
decisive action in the conflict. An involvement that had started with a naval blockade on the 
Adriatic, had, despite the realities on the ground, only progressed as far as Operation 'Deny 
Flight' by July 1995, enforcing a no-fly zone above Bosnia, and providing limited air to ground 
strikes when needed: it had not even been able to provide assistance to the Dutch forces in 
Srebrenica, despite the presence of Dutch F16s. Danish and Norwegian F16s had also 
participated, as they would in 'Deliberate Force', the NATO response to the continuing 
atrocities, which in only 12 days in August and September of that year persuaded the Bosnian 
Serb leadership to pursue a negotiated settlement . 'Deliberate Force' represented both an 195
American commitment to the overall mission in the former Yugoslavia, and a determination to 
find a solution, despite the differences which remained between the UK and France on one 
hand, and Germany on the other .  The Royal Netherlands Air Force, in particular, also 196
distinguished itself, flying almost 200 sorties over these 12 days, the highest number outside the 
three Security Council members - a welcome reassurance that Dutch security policy could 
make positive contributions to collective security. 
It would takes some months of negotiations before the signing of the Dayton agreement in Paris 
on the 14th of December, but as the 60,000 NATO troops in IFOR deployed soon after, it would 
at least prove to be the necessary response that civilians in Bosnia had waited almost five years 
for – from 1996 onwards, no Bosnian died in military conflict. This was a robust 'peace 
enforcement' operation, with a humanitarian aspect which made it relatively uncontroversial 
for the small Northern European allies, and had the advantage of significant continuity with 
UNPROFOR: the Dutch forces, consisting of a mechanised combat battalion, and a logistics 
squadron, would be serving under British command in Northwestern Bosnia, and the 
Scandinavian detachment would serve in a joint Nordic-Polish battalion, under American 
command in the North of the country.  
A glance at the small print, however brought some small, but significant differences: While the 
Dutch and Danes sent their forces with relatively uncomplicated rules of engagement, and were 
happy to serve on the front line, the Norwegian contingent was initially sent primarily in a 
'support' capacity, with medical and logistics companies serving ‘in the rear with the gear'  as 197
their Danish and Polish colleagues took the risks further forward. Fortunately, they did so in a 
much-improved theatre of operations, as all sides mostly kept to the peace agreement. IFOR's 
mission would only last one year, before it was replaced by the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in 
December 1996. Here Norway did choose to commit combat troops, with the 'Telemark' 
expeditionary battalion used for the first time since its formation  - a move that it was hoped 198
would bring some visibility to the Norwegian contribution, to go along with considerable 
financial contributions.  
SFOR would be the last major NATO operation in Bosnia, but it did last until 2003. The success 
of IFOR in stabilising Bosnia, canton by canton, allowing free elections to be held, meant that 
SFOR, and its Danish, Dutch and Norwegian components, would begin sending forces home 
from mid-1997 onwards. The successes were not generally on the field of battle - apprehending 
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war criminals, releasing hostages, protecting civil functions - but they were a step up from all 
the peacekeeping operation that had gone before, and served as an introduction to a new style 
of overseas deployment – these experiences on the ground were to serve as a template for later 
experiences further from home. NATO may have failed to live up to the 1991 Strategic 
Concept’s idea ‘increased opportunities for the successful resolution of crises at an early stage’, 
but the impotence of the initial stages contrasted with the effectiveness of the 12 day campaign 
that brought the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table, and a clearer vision would emerge in 
future: the age of military interventions had begun.  

Kosovo: War at Last! 

The unravelling of Yugoslavia into its national constituencies had begun in Kosovo, and there it 
would also end. The attacks against the Serbian population in the province began in early 1996, 
as IFOR was still pacifying Bosnia: Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) leaders felt that their plight 
was being forgotten as the eyes of the world were on Bosnia, and drastic action was needed. 
This drastic action did not immediately gain the desired traction however, as a certain Western 
war-weariness, and the need for the cooperation with Belgrade in Bosnia meant few wanted to 
be involved. This would change. 
Instability in neighbouring Albania, with its obvious kinship ties to Kosovars, and political 
tensions in Macedonia, with a large Albanian minority, concentrated on the border, led 
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic into a cack-handed attempt to manipulate the fragile 
region. ‘Kicking the hornet’s nest’ in Kosovo provoked a conflict that threatened to spill over 
into the wider Balkans, as around 230,000 refugees left, mainly to neighbouring states already 
on the risk of collapse, but Milosevic could also sense that NATO, and the US in particular, may 
not have the stomach to stop him. As the cycle of KLA attacks and Serbian reprisals worsened, 
the pressure on NATO to act became stronger. In the autumn of 1998, it began to apply 
pressure, putting states on high alert, though  a last-minute ceasefire, with the attendant need 
for OSCE monitors, and the withdrawal of Serbian forces was signed. 
It predictably lasted only a matter of weeks, and peace talks were scheduled for February. 
Fearing arrest by the IWCT in the Hague, Milosevic did not attend in person, and despite an 
agreement in principle to end the conflict, was unwilling to accept foreign peacekeepers in 
Kosovo – calling NATO’s bluff on threatened reprisals. Finally, the Americans were convinced of 
the need to take action, but many were not. Serbia itself was still stable, and a major regional 
economic and transport hub, so many were wary of destabilising it too.  Additionally, there was 
no real endgame for a bombing campaign, and critics were lining up. ‘The only alternative to 
shooting yourself in the foot, is not shooting yourself in the foot’ Carl Bildt, former UN envoy to 
Bosnia was reported to have said – but NATO did not want to lose face, and so the bombing 
began. 
As the bombing inevitably went on, Serbia refused to capitulate, and as the list of targets 
became more controversial, the search for a solution remained evasive: and although the tough 
talk of Tony Blair in particular sought to force a solution, it was the soft words of Finnish 
President Martti Ahtisaari into the ear of his Russian counterpart that persuaded Moscow to 
withdraw guarantees to Milosevic, and tip the balance in favour of a ground operation. 
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Although the scope of any such operation was similarly vague to the bombing campaign, it 
nonetheless succeeded in stabilising Kosovo, even if that stabilisation was at the price of ethnic 
cohabitation.  
In the build up to the bombing campaign, Denmark and Norway had been particularly wary of 
going ahead without a UN Security Council resolution – though first Denmark, and then 
Norway relented when it became clear that there was a general NATO consensus. The Dutch 
government, while mindful of the legal implications, were more mindful of the fact that they 
had unfinished business with Milosevic.  
And while all three contributed aircraft, the Netherlands’ twenty F16s  were by far the largest 199
per capita contribution, something they were able to do from the very first day of strikes, with 
Dutch fighters assisting in the initial wave of attacks aiming to disable Yugoslav air defences , 200
even shooting down a Yugoslav MiG-29 fighter in the process . The Royal Dutch Air Force 201
truly distinguished itself in the aerial campaign, and was happy with the perception that it had 
found itself elevated to NATO’s ‘A-team’ , with particular credit given to the ‘swing role’ 202
capacity they developed, whereby Dutch F16s deployed on combat missions could quickly be 
reconfigured for reconnaissance missions. Flexibility and deployability had been the motifs 
used in describing the land force transformation of the previous decade, so it was a welcome to 
see that the Air Force could do the same – the Dutch had found themselves a useful niche.  
Danish and Norwegian contributions to the air campaign had proven somewhat less useful, 
although their participation was welcome, and acknowledged. Denmark’s eight F16s had been 
deployed without crucial ‘laser pods’ which would have allowed them to use targeted 
ordinance, a crucial attribute in a campaign that  was explicit in its aim of avoiding civilian 
casualties – though they were still permitted to function in an air-to-ground capacity . Norway 203
deployed 6 F16s, but was the most critical of all the small allies min the nature of the bombing, 
with civilian targets coming under specific scrutiny: a stance which could be seen as a 
continuation of its Cold War ‘loyal critic’ role, as Norway was available when called upon, 
although only in a surveillance capacity .   204
Many aspects of the Kosovo campaign were unsatisfactory from a Norwegian perspective, and 
the government did not share the satisfaction of its Danish and Dutch equivalents’ about it. The 
deployment of the Norwegian ground troops for their KFOR role took three months, almost 
twice as long as for their Danish counterparts, reputedly prompting the NATO commander, Lt 
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Gen Sir Mike Jackson to comment ‘What took you so long? Have you been walking?’ . As we 205
saw in the previous chapter this would prompt a wholesale review of the force structure of the 
Norwegian forces – but that laggard battalion was not the first Norwegian ground deployment 
of the campaign. Government modesty, or secrecy, had led to Norwegian participation in the 
tense initial stages of the campaign being left unreported. It was a Norwegian Forsvarets 
Spesialkommando unit that was serving beside the British SAS as KFOR Special Forces entered 
the Kosovar capital Pristina, and was involved in the incident with Russian forces occupying the 
city’s airport which became one of the most famous moments in the campaign . A pattern was 206
emerging whereby Norway sought to do its work quietly and effectively, and would seek 
influence through reliability.  
For Denmark, the intervention was undertaken with an unprecedented level of public and 
political support, in what was its first real war since 1864. Even though the government had 
initially been wary of how such a use of force would be received, this was reflected in its 
unease about declaring that it was indeed ‘at war’. It needn’t have worried, as a Gallup poll in 
May, just before the deployment of ground troops, found the Danish public to be the most 
supportive of the mission among 12 European states. The parties themselves picked up on this, 
with even diverse groups like the sometime-pacifist Socialist People’s Party, or the isolationist 
Danish People’s Party voting to support KFOR when they had previously voted against the air 
war.  As other European allies prevaricated, Danish support was solid, a ‘logical, even 
predictable continuation of the foreign policy Denmark pursued in the 1990s’ – Denmark 
‘never questioned the Alliance policy and accepted the tough line adopted by the United 
States’, a sign of how things would develop through the next decade. 
The most significant aspect of the Kosovo intervention was the lack of a UN mandate - 
indicating that all three of our states had lost faith in that institution and now so a general 
NATO consensus as being adequate for a foreign intervention. The overall success of the 
mission, despite the initial, and widespread opposition, also underlined the utility of force, even 
for the smallest states.  
It was also the conflict that illustrated how useful niche capabilities could be - as we saw with 
the Royal Netherlands Air Force and their 'swing role' capability, and how a lack of such a 
capability, as Denmark witnessed, could lead to a more negative outcome. For Norway in 
particular, a certain niche capability, its Special Forces, was able to contribute, when a more 
conventional but outdated force proved entirely inadequate. This would not happen again.  

Afghanistan: Blood Prices and Caveats 

The Afghan conflict is one of extremes, just as the country has itself been mythologised as a 
land of extremes. In the contemporary popular imagination, as it tapers to a protracted end it is 
enlightening to be reminded of certain pertinent facts, from a NATO context. The Al Qaeda 
attacks which provoked the conflict, also brought the first invocation of Article V, something 
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which had originally been conceived to protect Western Europe, and not the continental United 
States . While the European response was ‘swift and firm’ , and the rhetoric ‘Nous sommes 207 208
tous américains’, the evolution of the American response, from ‘axis of evil’ to ‘war on terror’ 
and beyond precipitated the biggest crisis in Atlantic relations since the end of the Cold War. 
Militarily, while European allies had strengthened their supportive rhetoric with concrete 
support in a number of fields, and declared itself willing to do more, it was not to NATO that 
the US turned for in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), but to an ad-hoc Anglophone 
coalition consisting of its most trusted allies, with European partners appearing only later. 
In addition, the history of the Afghan War cannot be separated from that which began two years 
later in Iraq. While this was not a NATO mission, each of our states participated to a greater or 
lesser extent, against a backdrop of considerable public and political opposition, which led 
eventually in each case to withdrawal. Most prominent was the Dutch contribution of a battle 
group in Al-Muthanna province , under British command, an impressive commitment that 209
masked an unease with the whole operation which is symbolised by a bungled, pre-invasion 
press conference in which a junior Dutch officer seemed to endorse the coalition by his 
presence, causing the government to backtrack frantically.  
The Danish government was more full-blooded in its support, from the outset – distinguishing 
itself alongside the UK and Poland as the only European contributors to the initial operation. 
Newly-elected Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen was keen to stress his ‘Super Atlanticist’ 
credentials, even if it meant fall out at home, and compromising Denmark’s election campaign 
for the Security Council, which had stressed its peacekeeping and international law 
credentials .  210
Norwegian support for the Iraq debacle had been tepid and short, but in contrast their 
involvement in Afghanistan was sustained. The F16s deployed in October 2002 fired the first 
rounds in anger of any Norwegian forces since World War II, and another break with 
Norwegian security culture, the Special Forces deployed in various areas alongside American 
and British units were given publicity by the government in Oslo. This, as we saw in the last 
chapter, was the first real test of the modernised force structures that Norway had taken so long 
to implement, and allied confidence was shown when Norway accepted an offer to run a PRT 
in the Northern Fayrab province, bordering Turkmenistan.  
In many ways, this was a low-risk assignment, but one which would, nevertheless cause 
problems for a governing coalition which contained the anti-NATO Socialist Left party. As we 
have seen previously, Norway had not traditionally seen itself as a country which waged war, 
and so the mission was couched primarily in humanitarian terms – the Foreign Minister at the 
time, Jonas Gahr Støre described Norway’s involvement thus: ‘We are not there to make war, 
but to help a state that is impoverished and broken down by war and violence to start up on the 
difficult path towards peace and development.’   211
This narrative was to be expected, and so the attempt by ISAF partners to encourage Norway to 
redeploy into the more volatile southern provinces was a non-starter, even if it did cause some 
displeasure. A new Norwegian strategic narrative was emerging, whereby it would take on 
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responsibilities that were not necessarily at the highest level of strategic ambition, but on which 
they knew they could see out, and fulfil to the best of their abilities. In a conflict that was 
marked by the caveats and withdrawals of other states, Norway’s commitment was appreciated, 
and the unwillingness to go further south soon forgotten – some have even argued that such 
commitment even contributed to keeping common NATO installations marked for closure in 
Norway open, a sign that this new posture could deliver. 
While it too had sent an F16 detachment to the initial stages of OEF, Dutch participation in the 
Afghan conflict was limited until it was offered a PRT at the end of 2005. While it was a sign of 
confidence in the Netherlands’ ability to be a framework nation (a role which it had recently 
played in a UN peacekeeping mission in Ethiopia ) the Dutch public, and many politicians, 212
were sceptical when the plan was presented to the lower house in December. Symbolically 
introduced by the ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development, the 
emphasis was on reconstruction and fighting terrorism, with the risks to Dutch life seen as 
‘acceptable’  – and while the aforementioned article 100 of the constitution would be used to 213
denote a peacekeeping mission, article 96 would not – the Netherlands was resolutely not at 
war.  
The forces would be deployed to Uruzgan province, a tough deployment that was nonetheless 
a sign of confidence that the ‘Dutch Approach’ could work even in the birthplace of Taliban 
leader Mullah Omar. Significant outside pressure was applied – from NATO leaders, including 
the Dutch Secretary General, from Washington, and even from the UN , and by February 214
2006 a broad (enough) consensus had been reached. Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) would be 
distinct from OEF, because it would be Dutch – it would have a level-headed, ‘population-
centric’ approach, distinct from the American ‘enemy-centric’  one which concerned many in 215
The Hague. This was rhetoric employed across the coalition, though it would soon be forgotten, 
Peter-like, by many of its proponents.  
The first 1200 members of TFU were deployed in August of that year, to the ‘ink-spots’ of Tarin 
Kowt and Deh Rawod, from where they would slowly spread out and reconstruct the province. 
There was initial success, with lower casualties than British or Canadian forces in neighbouring 
provinces ,  but as 2007 progressed, the Taliban crept back into areas previously ‘cleared’ – a 216
phenomenon best captured by the first TFU commander: ‘It’s like water: if you don’t stay, it 
streams back’ . As casualties mounted, the softly-softly Dutch Approach began to look naïve, 217
and cracks began to form in the coalition. Even the MinBuZa and MoD began to distance 
themselves from previous positions, and tensions between the military-oriented outcomes of the 
TFU, and the civilian-oriented outcomes of the PRT emerged . At home, the political debate 218
turned towards the idea that Dutch forces were engaged in a ‘combat’ mission, and not one 
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based on reconstruction – ‘Dutch soldiers were supposed to build schools, promote women’s 
emancipation and invest in local government – and rather not fight too much ’.  219
Dutch navel-gazing, however, masked the fact that that 2007/08 was a bad year for all 
concerned in ISAF. The ‘Dutch Approach’ would be remixed and re-released as ‘3D’, and, while 
the politicians in the Hague were wringing their hands, TFU and the PRT were learning and 
adapting their methods on the ground , coming a long way towards implementing what they 220
had initially set out to do.  Indeed, by early 2009, Uruzgan could even be talked about as a 
‘flicker of light’  in the Afghan darkness.  Marines patrolling on bicycles , and the 221 222
development outcomes at the heart of the Dutch model had even caught the eye of the new 
administration in the White House, which gave a Dutch example towards the effectiveness of its 
new Afghan strategy. After a meeting with Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, President 
Obama announced that: ’The Dutch military has been one of the most outstanding militaries 
there, has shown extraordinary not only military capacity, but also insight into the local culture 
and the local politics. The review that we conducted in Afghanistan that emphasised the 3Ds of 
development, diplomacy, as well our ability to deploy troops effectively - that really was 
adopted from some strategies that had already been pursued effectively by the 
Netherlands.’ The Dutch military has been one of the most outstanding militaries there, has 223
shown extraordinary not o 
 This was not a one off - Secretary of State Clinton, and articles in the American press   saw 224
Uruzgan as the go-to good news story in an increasingly aimless and intractable conflict. But 
Balkenende would not get to return to the White House. While the mission had been extended 
for a further year, these good news stories had not been enough to turn the tide of opinion at 
home, and in February 2010, the government collapsed when its junior partner, the Labour 
party, withdrew its support for a further extension – although the publication of a government 
commission into Dutch involvement in the Iraq War a month previously may have also 
contributed to their decision.  
As TFU and the Government collapsed in ignominy, it exposed not a military failure, but what 
Dutch military historian Chris Klep has described as an ‘expectation gap’: one between the 
‘Dutch Approach’/ ‘3D’ and the reality on the ground in Uruzgan; between capabilities and 
outcomes; and between politicians and the electorate. The ‘Dutch Approach’ always so vague 
and catch-all, that any attempts to attribute it to the initial successes of the mission were storing 
up trouble, as the PRT only actually had two civilian members during this time . The switch, 225
under pressure, to ‘3D’ presented a false alternative that only confused the aims of the mission 
in the eyes of the public: even as it proved á la mode in the Obama administration, some  226
have posited this as the result of US State Department attempts to force an American strategic 
change of tack. 
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Domestically, the ‘combat or reconstruction’ dichotomy was simplistic and misleading, but this 
debate over military intervention somewhat ironically came to the government fighting an 
opposition on a battlefield that was not of their choosing, even before TFU had started its first 
rotation. The initial stages were a huge missed opportunity to sell the mission correctly, with a 
distinct unwillingness to even mention the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) aspects that were vital to 
the success of such a mission . A certain post-colonial squeamishness  at using such 227 228
terminology may have been understandable, but it just served to underline a lack of 
communication between the administration, its civil service and the military – and was a strong 
indicator of a lack of resolve in the coalition that implemented it. This only served to make the 
job harder for TFU, even if senior commanders always knew what had to be done, even from 
the start: ‘We must also be prepared, in certain places where we cannot construct, to fight in 
order to achieve that security’.  229
TFU was only composed of a maximum of 500 infantry soldiers to cover a large region with 
400,000 inhabitants. They fought hard, in a textbook COIN manner , losing 24 lives in the 230 231
process, and while the ‘Dutch Approach’ may have proven less cuddly than it initially set out 
to, even critics accept that TFU troops were more culturally aware than other ISAF 
colleagues . Civilian participation in the PRT had increased significantly over the four years, 232
as doctrinal crinkles were smoothed over, and by 2009 50 NGOs were active in Uruzgan 
Province, an undeniable improvement from what had gone before. But there was also the 
knock-on effect of such a tough campaign in such an out-of-the-way location on military 
budgets, as the MoD had to find funds to keep fighting from its own budget, in the face of the 
cuts we discussed in Chapter 1. What was, in some ways, another indication of the collapse of 
political support for the military, came at a time when real, tangible benefits to the Dutch 
national interest, beyond the kind words of President Obama, had begun to show. It 
subsequently emerged  that, as a direct result of their actions in Uruzgan, the Dutch had been 233
invited into the hallowed ‘five eyes’ circle of intelligence sharing between the US and its closest 
allies, an arrangement that didn’t last much longer than TFU.  
There was significantly less drama in the Danish intervention in Afghanistan. While ongoing 
commitments in Kosovo and Iraq prevented them from making a significant contribution in the 
early stages, Danish Special Forces had been intermittently active in diverse parts of the 
country . In 2006, the decision was taken to deploy a Danish contingent to Helmand 234
province, bordering Uruzgan, and a year later the final withdrawal of Danish troops from Iraq 
allowed them to increase their contribution to a full battlegroup . There would be plenty ‘hard 235
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work’ to do, but the troops were deployed with no caveats, the only instructions being, it 
seemed to ‘respect the laws of war and cooperate closely with your British commander’ . 236
They paid a great price – with the 40 deaths of Danish troops in Helmand the highest per capita 
loss of the ISAF nations. Unlike in the Dutch case, however, the coalition that authorised the 
deployment stayed together, and indeed the only opposition in parliament came from 2 smaller, 
hard-left parties. Additionally, the government cooperated closely with the military to ensure 
that the narrative was one of success in meeting objectives, a view which was also shared by 
the majority of policy makers, and by media and public opinion . The case was consistently 237
and straightforwardly made that ‘Denmark is in Afghanistan to defend Denmark’ , and while, 238
as we saw earlier, there was an attempt to apply the principles of the new CPA, expectations 
were more realistic. The more explicitly moral aspect of the mission was the new, more 
muscular version of the 90s doctrine – what some have called 'international activism' , as the 239
administration of Anders Fogh Rasmussen moved beyond the advances of the previous decade.  
Danish success in Helmand, and the solidity of the support at home, led to pressure being put 
on the Danes to lead a PRT of their own , in the Nimruz province bordering Iranian and 240
Pakistani Balochistan. This was to prove the most significant disappointment of the deployment, 
as a lack of funds meant that they would have to turn the opportunity down. Danish willingness 
to contribute positively had, until this point, covered for certain shortages that would inevitably 
exist with declining military budgets, and whatever gargantuan efforts were made to deploy so 
many fighting men to Helmand, the civilian imprint needed for a successful PRT was lacking, 
with less than 10 diplomats on the ground at any time .  241
The conflict in Afghanistan was significant for NATO in so many ways. Not only the first 
invocation of article IV, it has continued to resonate even as that decade of interventions has 
ended. It also underlines the importance of strategic narratives in foreign policy, an idea also 
picked up on by the Dutch foreign policy advisory body, the AIV. The Dutch narrative started 
strongly, with the successes of its Air Force in Kosovo meaning it was seen as an ideal initial 
partner in OEF, and being given a PRT in such a critical area could only be seen as vote of 
confidence in Dutch military capability. As we saw, praise on the conduct and philosophy of 
TFU bookended that encouraging start, but somehow the Balkenende administration contrived 
to fluff their lines, and the withdrawal of TFU could stay with Dutch foreign policy for some 
time. 
Denmark, and to a lesser extent, Norway, had a lower level of strategic ambition, but they stuck 
to what they knew they could deliver, and they did it well. The narrative which was created was 
one of success, and they could stick to it with confidence – even when casualties mounted. This 
was because they did not shy away from the grittier aspects of the mission: ‘Denmark’s military 
operation in Afghanistan is highlighted and described candidly to the domestic audience’ . 242
                                                                       46
 Jakobsen & Møller, p.109236
 MacDonald, Alastair ‘Denmark Rallies Public Behind Afghan War’ Wall Street Journal 24/02/2010237
 Ringsmose & Børgesen, p.521238
 Pedersen, p.336239
 Ringsmose & Rynning, p.77240
 Ibid, p.78241
 Dommersnes, p.20242
The unforgiving nature of Afghanistan, environmentally and to the hopes of those outsiders who 
meddle in its affairs, has become cliché. The Dutch were not alone in under-performing: the 
Canadian forces in next-door Kandahar withdrew in similar circumstances a year later , and it 243
has been convincingly argued that the whole ISAF mission suffered from a lack of clear purpose 
after the fall of the Taliban in 2001 . However, this did little to assuage the damage done to 244
Dutch strategic confidence, which it had worked hard to rebuild after Srebrenica. Six months 
before the final withdrawal of TFU, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, whose appointment had meant so 
much at the time,  was replaced as Secretary General. That his successor was Danish Prime 
Minister Ander Fogh Rasmussen was symbolic, at least in the context of this study. 

Libya: Easy for Some 

Looked at from a certain angle, the NATO intervention in the Libyan Civil War could be seen as 
a perfect example of the sort of intervention that symbolised a NATO secure in its new Post-
Cold War self: initially French-led, a broad base of support, and none of the diplomatic 
semantics that delayed the first intervention of the period in Bosnia. Yet, as the conflict 
progressed, the old demons re-emerged. The United States took on a larger share of duties than 
it had originally intended, the European allies were embarrassingly under-equipped, and the 
enthusiasm of some allies could not disguise the bandwagoning of others – hard facts which 
inspired Secretary Gates’ speech mentioned in the introduction.  
Yet, speaking strictly of the mission itself, rather than its consequences, it can be considered a 
broad success. The reaction to the crisis was quick and effective, and Atlantic states put 
themselves into the reformist camp of the ‘Arab Spring’ the machinations of which they had 
been slow to respond to - If only all targets had been as soft and as loathsome as Muammar al-
Gaddafi’s Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and all interventions as simple as the 
air campaign which toppled it.  
Events in the wider region had brought renewed vigour to the disparate, tribal-oriented 
opposition to Gaddafi’s state, and an armed insurrection, made up of these diverse groups, 
unified only in their opposition , had succeeded in gaining control of several cities, including 
the strategic port city of Benghazi. The regime pushed back in its usual brutal fashion, and as 
reports emerged of war crimes being perpetrated, reached the outskirts of Benghazi in early 
March 2011. Fearing what would happen should the regime’s superior firepower prevail, the 
UN Security Council passed resolution 1973, imposing a no-fly zone over Libya, and French 
jets began the enforcement, soon to be joined by a broad coalition.  
That coalition would eventually include the Netherlands, but only after much post-Uruzgan 
angst and squabbling. Their lukewarm support for the mission placed them in a somewhat 
unfamiliar position, as the recipient of explicit criticism from Secretary Gates , alongside 245
iterant bandwagoneers Germany, Spain and Turkey. While they did not abstain like the 
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Germans, it was difficult to tell the difference – ‘participation’ consisted of a group of 
minesweepers that happened to already be in the vicinity, and six F16s that were unable to take 
part in high-intensity operations .  246
Dutch intervention started disastrously with a bizarre attempt to extricate a Dutch national from 
Gaddafi’s home town of Sirte in late February  – lacking permission from the embattled 247
government, the three navy rescuers and their helicopter were held hostage for over a week 
before being returned. This succeeded in tying an already confused Tweede Kamer into further 
knots, coming at a time when deep defence cuts were about to be announced which would see 
even the minesweepers participating in the Mediterranean off Libya scrapped. The newly 
elected, nominally pro-military and resolutely Atlanticist VVD was finding government a little 
harder than opposition, and its choice of the populist, isolationist PVV as a partner would be 
questioned more than once. 
A perfect illustration of the changing fortunes of Dutch foreign policy was the decision in June 
of that year to provide the Danish Air Force with unused Dutch ordnance .  For the Danes, 248
and the Norwegians, Libya would be seen in an almost entirely positive light – emerging from 
the campaign with American endorsements such as ‘best in class’  (Norway) and ‘the rock 249
stars of the campaign’  (Denmark) ringing in their ears. They flew more missions per capita 250
than any of the other allies , and combined dropped as much ordinance as the United 251
Kingdom . In what was a textbook ‘War of Choice’ of the new century, made up of a 252
‘Coalition of the Willing’, both states underscored the fact that it was also a ‘Coalition of the 
willing and able’ : in this, post-2008 economic crisis conflict, two small states, relatively 253
unaffected by Eurozone or debt crises, were able to exploit this opportunity to become trusted 
and strategically useful members of the coalition. Although, in acknowledging this aspect of 
their contribution, it must be noted that the air-to-ground nature of the operation was a 
fortunate aspect for two states whose contributions elsewhere would have precluded them from 
participating in a ground campaign. 
For the Danes, the almost unanimous  decision of the Folketing to deploy F16s  to intervene 254
was presented as ‘good news’ by Foreign Minister Lene Espersen . Libya, following on from 255
Afghanistan, was another chance to ‘do the right thing’, support the Arab spring, topple a 
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universally loathed dictator, and again stand up for ‘Danish values’ – a mindset so removed 
from the one in the Netherlands, or elsewhere in Europe,  that there was even a far-left party 
calling for ‘boots on the ground’ . Such was the desire to ‘make a difference’ that the six 256
Danish F16s, deployed, as ever without caveats, arrived in Sicily only 57 hours after UNSC 
1973, before the coalition had even had time to formulate a plan: something that led to the 
head of the Norwegian Air Force to phone his Danish counterpart to enquire ‘how on earth 
could the planes deploy so fast?’ . 257
The Norwegians were not so far behind, with six of their own F16s deploying to Crete soon 
after – also without caveats; ready to play a role on the frontline: something of a first for Post-
Cold War Norwegian security policy. The existence of the UN mandate obviously helped, but it 
was also a final step in completing the transformation from ‘the last Cold Warrior’ to a member 
of NATO’s top-tier. It also provided a further example of the Norwegian ambition to seek ‘status 
through reliability’, focusing on what it can do, and staying away from the unsustainable grand 
geste. 
Initially, the Operation Odyssey Dawn (OED) command seemed unwilling to allow much 
Norwegian participation, but as the mission progressed, their willingness and consistency 
meant they were trusted with increasingly sensitive missions – culminating in the strike against 
the convoy carrying Gaddafi himself, which ultimately brought the mission to an end.  The very 
fact that a small state like Norway was trusted in such a way was apparently seen as succour 
enough for politicians and opinion formers at home  - Norway was maybe small, but it could 258
be ‘as good as’ other European allies.  
It is still unsure what the ultimate consequences of OED will be, but it certainly succeeded in a 
military sense. For NATO, this is a mixed blessing: the alliance is certainly still effective, but the 
fact that only six out of the twenty six European allies participated fully in the operation gave 
the Gates speech undoubted salience. Two of the six contributors, Denmark and Norway, were 
thus able to exercise enormous influence in relation to their size, which may be seen as the 
fortunate confluence of relative economic strength and mission suitability – but an analysis of 
the general trends of Danish and Norwegian strategic culture over the previous two decades 
indicates that it is the culmination of a concerted search for status through force contribution. 
Both states filled a gap, demonstrating that their niches could extended beyond special forces 
contributions, as they had in Kosovo and Afghanistan. While it is too early to understand what 
benefits this brought to them in terms of top-table influence, studies  of the aftermath of 259
Danish contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate that ‘hard work’ can facilitate access to 
policy makers and government officials in Washington that would previously not been possible.  
There is no evidence to suggest that Denmark sought to exploit its new-found status, preferring, 
like Norway, to let this status add sheen to a broader foreign policy strategy. There is certainly 
an ongoing debate over how such a robust contribution to security-related matters fits with their 
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traditional role as peace-promoters, with even figures like the former Norwegian Foreign 
Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre acknowledging the tensions inherent in a ‘peace nation’ pursuing 
these goals using less-than-peaceful methods  - but praise from across the Atlantic may have 260
smoothed that wrinkle.  

     * * * 

Traditional analyses of small states sees them being peripheral in European and World affairs – 
this study of Post-Cold War conflicts shows that to be somewhat changed. At the beginning of 
our period, all of our states saw the UN as being central to the new security reality, and all of 
them saw how inadequate it would prove to be – using force would sometimes be necessary, 
and small states could find that use of force to be useful in their broader ‘activist’ foreign policy 
outlook.  
In Bosnia, it was the rigorous and unglamorous work of SFOR, and then IFOR which brought 
peace, and so when a UN mandate for action in Kosovo was lacking, NATO became a 
preferred option. In these two conflicts, the Netherlands, and the Royal Netherlands Air Force in 
particular, had stood out as a small state willing to make a large contribution: Denmark too, to 
a lesser extent, showed how use of force was a valid option for small states able to contribute, 
and how public opinion could be could be won. Norway would undoubtedly have seen this as 
good reason to renew its force structure and orientation in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict. 
Norway was not the only state to learn from these conflicts: as NATO moved ‘out of area’ into 
Afghanistan, Danish and Dutch doctrines evolved through a process of trial and error, but there 
is evidence, particularly in the American appreciation of ‘3D’, that ‘norm entrepreneurship’ 
could extend to security policy.  
This conflict also showed the importance of narrative building, and the importance of placing 
foreign policy objectives into the context of a deeper strategic culture: Dutch problems in 
Uruzgan were in many ways peculiarly Dutch, but also contain lessons for all NATO states, as 
we saw. Afghanistan showed the limits of the new ambitious, more expeditionary Atlantic 
alliance, as Denmark was initially unable to contribute because of commitments elsewhere: 
although Norway could be pleased with how a new approach had allowed it to contribute. 
This was a general theme of the later part of our period: as the ‘War of Choice’ concept 
emerged, small states could gain certain advantages, especially if they were ‘willing and able’. 
Because Norway and Denmark were more able, the NATO intervention in Libya was a more 
straightforward affair than it was for an embattled Dutch armed forces. As we saw, a more 
intensive contribution may have been beyond them, but an air campaign allowed them to build 
on an impressive record of reliability and usefulness in a NATO context, while concomitantly 
pursuing broader foreign policy objectives in upholding International Law, and promoting 
human rights: a perfect example of an ‘activist’, ‘smart state’ strategy.  
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Chapter 3: Enlargement 

 As the myth of Eastern Bloc power began to crumble around the events of 1989, Soviet 
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited the NATO HQ in Brussels – the first time the 
holder of that office had done such a thing. He had, in his own words ‘been to the mouth of the 
volcano...and it wasn’t too bad’ . It is an appropriate metaphor for a time when the streets of 261
Communist Eastern Europe were aflame, and change was flowing, sometimes slowly, often fast, 
like molten lava that would eventually cool, and leave the geopolitical landscape of Europe 
forever altered.  
By 2011, all of the former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members would find themselves in NATO, 
alongside the ex-Soviet Baltic States - something that would have been utterly inconceivable 
when Shevardnadze visited Brussels in 1989. The modern Russian Federation may feel a certain 
injustice, and certainly feels encircled, but any debate about whether the US and Atlantic 
partners broke promises of non-interference in the new East are entirely academic: the NATO 
‘empire by invitation’  was also expanded, enthusiastically, by invitation.  262
‘Those who wonder why the east Europeans became so obsessed with NATO membership 
should search through the annals of the Yugoslav saga’  – the topic of enlargement is closely 263
related to the previous two chapters, and the trends are the same. As per the Eyal quote, not 
only had NATO found its role in the Bosnian conflict, as an institution, alongside, of course, the 
EU, it was an symbol of the values that the new governments strove towards and (mostly) 
wanted to implement. Also in terms of capabilities, the trends inherent in the enlargement 
process are often shared. 
For our smaller states too, enlargement presented opportunities, and some challenges. From an 
idealistic perspective, it obviously appealed – and brining these other (mostly small) states into 
a consensus organisation such as NATO was also important for the values and outlook that we 
have seen. But there was also an undeniable strain of self interest involved – either in agitating 
for the inclusion of certain states, or in trying to avoid it.  
Understanding how small states pursue this self-interest is essential to the purposes of this study 
in general, and will become particularly pertinent in this final chapter, where ideas of common 
structures, as in capabilities, or common problems, as in conflicts as less evident, and greater 
differences of opinion appear. So it is important to examine these interests, through the policies 
pursued by the governments over this period – and then by trying to understand if they were 
able to pursue this self interest and influence NATO policies towards enlargement. It will also 
be interesting to examine whether small state ‘niches’ could also extend to diplomatic 
capabilities – could our states be useful to the alliance at the negotiating table too? 
Shevardnadze was rare for a senior Soviet politician, in that he was also a ‘nationality’ – he 
then went on to become a pro-Western President of Georgia, whose tenure nonetheless 
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collapsed under the weight of corruption and vote-rigging allegations in 2003. As a result of the 
democratic reforms enacted by his successor, Georgia became a candidate for NATO 
membership, with an individual Membership Action Plan (MAP). By that point, after two 
successful enlargements, it would seem like an organised process – it was anything but. For 
most states though, the journey would prove to be just as important as the arrival. 

The Road and The Miles to Madrid (1989-97) 

At the beginning of our period, even as the Soviet monolith began to totter, few would predict 
an Atlantic future for most of the Eastern Bloc. But it seemed for these few years around the start 
of the new decade that time had sped up, and a number of developments served to change that 
perception very quickly. First came the London Agreement of July 1990, as ‘the hand of 
friendship’ was extended by NATO states to their former adversaries. Just over a year later, at the 
Rome Summit which also gave us a new Strategic Concept, the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC) was launched as a ‘necessary prevarication’  to allow a better plan to be 264
formulated.  
Containing as it did all of the Post-Soviet and Communist states, including those in Central Asia, 
in a vague and ultimately toothless body, this was never going to be the most suitable of 
security fora, but it was not until January 1994 that the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was launched 
at the Brussels Summit and aspiring members were finally given a roadmap. Not only did this 
provide the mechanisms for the armed forces of the two blocs to finally get a chance to work 
together, the PfP was based upon the principle of ‘Self Differentiation’, whereby it would be the 
choice of each individual state to prove, through their actions, that they could be a suitable 
candidate for NATO accession. In 1995, the ‘Study of Enlargement’ was published, that set forth 
for the first time a list of the terms and conditions that aspiring countries would need to meet. It 
was from this point on that enlargement became inevitable, and the question changed to ‘who 
and how’ . A remarkable turnaround from 1989 perhaps, but ‘the story is one of a serious and 265
correct decision arrived at through halting diplomatic discussions and haphazard, last minute 
decision making’ .   266
It was German unification that had muddied the waters most. While the Post-Communist states 
of Central and Eastern Europe were, in the main, united in their goal of gaining entry to NATO 
(especially after mess of the Yugoslav break-up), the United States, United Kingdom and France 
were all on slightly different pages on how to deal with Russia. Germany, most of all, wanted to 
reassure Moscow that its ‘loss’ would not be translated immediately into a Western ‘gain’ – a 
view which was shared in Washington.  
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So it was that the larger NATO states were slow to accept the benefits of Central European 
membership – and any expansion beyond that, such as into the Baltic States, would hurt 
Moscow most of all: the still had troops based there until August 1994. The alternative, 
however, was a return to the ad hoc, inter war system which had turned the region into the 
‘bloodlands’, something which even Russia seemed to acknowledge, and so it dropped its 
opposition to expansion, in return for a permanent NATO-Russia forum in Paris in May 1997. 
Even in letting its former satellites go, however, it could not resist the urge to negotiate with 
NATO directly, over the heads of the aspirant members . This was the last significant hurdle to 267
be cleared before the three ‘Visegrad’ states; the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were 
invited to join at the Madrid summit later that year. 
The Netherlands' attitudes towards expansion are a good example of fairly mainstream thinking 
within the alliance. As during the Cold War, their principle aim was to keep Germany firmly 
within Western security structures, and so initial policy was made with the successful 
conclusion of the unification process in mind. There was support for the PfP - indeed the first 
joint exercise of NATO and former WP troops, ‘Competitive Spirit’, was held on Dutch soil in 
October 1994  - but the government preference was for the ‘Royal Way’ , in which NATO 268 269
membership would follow membership of the EU. There was enough dissent, however, to make 
this a far from unanimous policy – firstly, from those wishing to speed up the process, and 
secondly, from a more self-interestedly liberal direction that did not wish to damage relations 
with Russia. It would be the former opinion that would win out, however, as the ‘Purple 
coalition’ government, containing both these elements of Dutch opinion, decided to support 
the Visegrad accession . 270
Denmark was also preoccupied with what German unification would mean for the future of 
NATO, but came from a different perspective, and went in a different direction. As we noted in 
Chapter 1, the radically changed Danish ‘action space’ placed it no longer on the front line , 271
and the strategic possibilities were huge. It was therefore in Denmark’s interest to keep its 
‘strategic distance’ as much as possible from the new Russia, something which the accession of 
the three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, into NATO would ensure. Additionally, as 
a non-member of the WEU, German influence in that body, particularly in Central Europe, 
would have to be countered, and so three new small members on the Northern flank would fit 
that ‘dependency spreading’  role perfectly. Finally, in the context of Denmark’s new ‘active 272
internationalism’, these three states, with their significant historical and cultural ties to 
Scandinavia, could ease their democratic transition with the help of a supportive Denmark - 
norm entrepreneurs need to export their values too. 
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The necessities of non-interference in domestic Soviet politics precluded governmental 
involvement in the area until after independence, but there were extensive contacts made 
below that level nonetheless . Denmark was, after Iceland, the second state to recognise 273
Baltic sovereignty, and the previous ‘Russia first’ policy was quickly abandoned to facilitate 
Danish involvement in the region . They benefitted from the ability of the two contemporary 274
Defence Ministers, Uffe Elleman-Jensen, and Hans Hækkerup, to understand the importance 
that these states played in the big picture  of Danish strategic culture, and they became a 275
‘high priority’ in Danish foreign policy.  
Denmark saw itself as a ‘pioneer’ in a region that was not well understood by other NATO 
allies. By 1993, it had signed individual defence agreements with all three states, with Danish 
advisors permanently based with the respective Ministries of Defence, and Denmark was an 
early and consistent supporter, both economically and structurally, of the BALTBAT initiative 
that provided a forum for military cooperation between the three states, support that continued 
as that structure widened into naval and air force cooperation. Danish officers provided vital 
training, particularly in peacekeeping formations, which the Baltic states would use as their 
main security tool in NATO operations, and equipment .  276
‘Danish policymakers viewed military and institutional activism as basically two sides of the 
same coin, because both served as a means to the same end: a stable, rule-governed and highly 
institutionalised international environment protecting Danish security interests’ . As a member 277
of all the relevant bodies in the region, NATO, the EU and the Council of Baltic Sea States 
(CBSS), Denmark could also offer the Baltic States something more than the other Scandinavian 
states interested in the region . The map they gave them towards integration into the Atlantic 278
Community was a Danish one, with NATO providing the security and hard power, and the EU 
the soft, economic power . The fact that the Baltic States were never really considered 279
seriously for the first expansion was accepted in Copenhagen , because they knew that the 280
explicit acknowledgement of their eligibility for the next round  was recognition enough.  281
While the Maastricht opt-out also bequeathed a ‘strategic distance’ to Denmark in Central 
Europe, Poland was still very much in Denmark’s neighbourhood. While the Cold War 
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relationship was marked by Polish touchiness over military exercises around the Baltic island of 
Bornholm, there was a rapid thawing of relations after 1989. Danish support may have been 
less significant than in the states to the North, both as a result of Poland being larger, and more 
of a cause célèbre, but Danish military and institutional support of Poland was also consistent, 
as witnessed in bilateral preparations for NATO memberships, and also trilateral cooperation 
with Germany  – an idea best embodied after enlargement as the Multinational Corps 282
Northeast, based in Szczecin, and containing forces from all three states,   became one of 
NATO’s first multinational formations . 283
The final pertinent fact surrounding Danish involvement in the Baltic surrounds the extent to 
which they acted as a US proxy. While initial US unwillingness to consider any expansion that 
would displease Moscow was at odds with Denmark’s enthusiastic engagement in the region, 
subsequent developments brought an alignment in their interests. While American, and 
German, involvement with the Baltic States had to potential to be far more significant, it could 
also cause irreparable damage to a sensitive process . And so, Denmark would provide an 284
early example of niche capabilities not being confined to the battlefield, as their involvement, 
principally among the Nordic states, supplied the ‘motor’  for Baltic integration into these 285
common structures, as acknowledged by US Secretary of State Madeline Albright . Denmark 286
was a useful ally to have . 287
Norway, as in the previous two chapters, was slow on enlargement. It had obvious, specific 
reasons for non-engagement, like its position on the European periphery, far from Central and 
Eastern Europe, and of course its border with Russia, which had not changed. Norway's 
principle priority during this period, and after, was the Barents Sea area it shared with Russia, 
and so it was certainly the least engaged of the Nordic states in Baltic affairs. This did change 
slightly with the rejection of EU membership in a 1994 referendum, which strategically left 
Norway at risk of being marginalised, and so engagement in bodies like the CBSS became 
attractive. Nevertheless, it remained resolutely opposed to Baltic accession in 1997, even if it 
had softened its stance towards the Visegrad three.  
Peeling back the iron curtain had led to an inevitable recalibration of policies towards the new 
states of Central and Eastern Europe, and as we have seen, circumstances dictated that this was 
not always done in a considered way. While the Dutch could afford to follow the crowd, 
Danish and Norwegian strategic interest was best served by policies that sat at opposite ends of 
the spectrum, and both were comfortably outside the mainstream. In this case, the advantage 
lay with Denmark's more radical policy as NATO became the ante-chamber for the EU, rather 
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than the other way around, with that body extending its own hand of friendship to the region 
soon after the Madrid summit. Again, a clear, concentrated foreign policy interest had proven to 
be more durable than one left to the mercy of events.  
Largely thanks to the activism of Denmark (although non-NATO Sweden and Finland did play 
their part) this first enlargement would not be the singular event  some would have liked. While 
the Visegrad three were alone in being invited to join at the Madrid summit, the terms put 
forward in the Study of Enlargement indicated that they would not remain the only Post-
Communist members for long. While other members, such as France with Romania, or Italy 
with Slovenia, had lobbied for their own candidates , the Baltic States were a radical direction 288
for NATO to go in, and one which could potentially destabilise the whole process. The larger 
NATO states acknowledged this, and so it would be that, as Europe was realigning, even the 
small states could find a way to influence the proceedings.  

Filling in the Blanks (1997-2008) 

The 50th anniversary NATO summit in Washington in April 1999 should have been an entirely 
celebratory affair: not only the significant milestone being passed, but a new Strategic Concept 
for a new era, and the accession of three Post-Communist states into a new Atlantic security 
structure. Conversely, it was of course filled with the slide into hostilities with Milosevic’s 
Serbia, a conflict that threw the haphazard and last minute enlargement process into sharp 
relief: one of the accession states, Hungary, had close historical and kinship ties to Northern 
Serbia – ties that some feared could either make them a less reliable ally, and additionally, 
highlighted the presence of large Hungarian populations in the wider Balkans that could be a 
cause of instability in themselves. 
Yet despite, or maybe even because of,  the new problems that membership posed to the newly 
democratic states of the Post-Communist space, the queue for NATO membership continued to 
grow.  The Membership Action Plan (MAP) process was introduced in Washington , allowing 289
a clear path to membership to emerge for the first time. The second Post-Cold War intake, and 
the fifth overall, comprised of seven states, including the Baltic states, and meant that almost 
three quarters of former Warsaw Pact successor states were now NATO members. A further 
enlargement took place in 2008, as Croatia and Albania, who had both formerly attracted 
NATO ire, brought the alliance firmly into the Western Balkans. 
For the most part, these enlargements were uncontentious. NATO had found its role as the 
‘Global Policeman’, and these new states participated in the missions in Kosovo, Macedonia 
and Afghanistan. The end of the 1990s were the real nadir of Russian power, economically and 
militarily: any fear of what consequences pushing further into Moscow’s former zone of 
influence had been almost forgotten. But that would not last for ling, and the period would be 
marked by a slow return to Russian assertiveness, culminating in the 2008 conflict in Georgia, a 
MAP participant. 
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This was the culmination of much diplomatic effort in Copenhagen, as we saw in the last 
chapter, and Denmark continued to pursue its interest in an expanded NATO, holding a 
conference on enlargement in Copenhagen in 2002, and sustaining cooperation agreements 
and aid to new member states. The 1999 SC had allowed for cooperation between PfP states 
and NATO for the first time, giving NATO a vital role in European security – allowing Denmark 
to participate in ways which its Maastricht exemptions meant it could not under the aegis of the 
EU. There was obviously a further advantage to Danish interests in increasing the number of 
small states in a consensus-based organisation like NATO, as opposed to seeing them in the EU, 
with its qualified majority voting, and Denmark increasingly unable to exert the influence it had 
previously . 290
For the Netherlands, happy to go with mainstream opinion, although always mindful of Russia, 
this period of enlargement presented few problems. For Norway, while the initial doubts 
remained, there was acceptance that the consensus was very much in favour of continuing the 
process. In some ways this was a crisis for NATO-Norway relations: NATO had always been its 
‘insurance policy’ , and now was acting in ways that were detrimental to Norwegian security. 291
Throughout the 1990s, there had been a steadily decreasing interest in the High North, which 
had previously made Norway an extremely important strategic partner for NATO, and been its 
‘free ticket’ to the top table- it became increasingly clear that this was no longer the case . 292
  
However, as we have seen elsewhere, the turn of the century also marked a change in overall 
Norwegian Security Policy, away from territorial defence and onto a more mainstream NATO 
footing – the evidence also points towards the skeptical attitude to enlargement fading too, 
especially as it echoed deeply held beliefs of Norway as an idealistic actor , although there 293
may have also been a degree of ‘Nordic rivalry’  in ensuring that they would not be the only 294
one of their neighbours left out of the enlargement party.  
The period of these two enlargements began with the tragedy around the sinking of the Russian 
nuclear submarine ‘Kursk’ in the Barents Sea in 1999. It works well as a demonstration of 
Russian impotence in the late 1990s, as a serious of incompetent cover-ups, and obstinate 
refusals of outside help ended with an (unsuccessful) Anglo-Norwegian rescue operation, and a 
Dutch salvage mission.  The ending of this period was also marked by Russian submersibles in 
the Barents Sea – but this time they were planting a Russian flag on the seabed, an entirely 
symbolic act that nonetheless demonstrated a new assertiveness that would make any future 
expansion very difficult.  

The End of the Road? (2008-11) 
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Events throughout 2008 were vital in shaping the future debate into enlargement. It began in 
February with a Kosovar declaration of independence, which certain NATO states, in common 
with Serbia and Russia, refuse to acknowledge. The August conflict over two states seceding 
from Georgia, yet recognised only by Russia, was presented as further proof of Russian 
intransigence, supported by the evidence of an increase in overflights of NATO neighbours, 
including Norway. After the furore had subsided, it emerged that Georgia had provoked the 
confrontation as an ill-conceived attempt to hurry along membership negotiations, but despite 
this, Russia was back in the Atlantic consciousness.   
While the last enlargement, bringing in Croatia and Albania was not especially damaging for 
the Russian ego, Serbia signing a PfP agreement at the same time, with the possibility of 
membership, could be – and the beginning of a new round of bilateral NATO-Russia talks that 
year was dominated by enlargement. Suddenly, Georgian and Ukrainian MAPs were put on 
hold, and while they were both mentioned specifically in the 2010 SC, the emphasis was on 
cooperation, not membership – elsewhere, the emphasis on future membership had been put 
on democracy and shared values, something which Georgia and Ukraine had had trouble 
convincing NATO leaders of.  
From the Dutch perspective, future enlargement risked provoking Russia, and with it the 
increase in bilateral trade and good diplomatic relations that the two countries had enjoyed. 
The position of the government towards Ukraine and Georgia was best described by the 
government advisory board on Foreign Relations, the AIV: ‘the admission of Ukraine and 
Georgia would not be desirable at present since these countries do not fulfil the conditions laid 
down in the 1995 Study on NATO enlargement, and admission would not enhance stability in 
their region. ‘  295
Denmark was still broadly in support of further enlargement, but would also have to accept that 
the moment had passed. Prime Minister, and future NATO SG, Anders Fogh Rasmussen had 
visited Georgia just after the conflict with Russia had ended, stressing restraint, but his visit was 
viewed very positively in Georgia. Additionally, over the period, Denmark sent some 15%, the 
largest tranche, of its Oversea Development Aid (ODA) budget to the Ukraine, seeking to build 
on previous success in the Post-Soviet space. 
It was Norway though which found the events moving towards a greater alignment of 
Norwegian and NATO policies. Norway was a ‘front-line’ state again, witnessing a huge 
increase in Cold War-style overflights from Russian military aircraft, and in December 2009, the 
failed test of a new generation Russian submarine-launched missile was visible in the sky over 
northern Norway, causing public alarm . New misgivings over the newest enlargement were 296
aired, and for a change were listened to, at the highest levels. 
The new Norwegian position was not entirely defensive, however. They also proved their ability 
to work effectively with Russia on a bilateral basis, with the September 2010 signing of a 
cooperation agreement in the Barents Sea, which fixed the long disputed maritime border 
between the two states, and allowed them both to press ahead with exploration of a region 
thought to be rich in natural gas and petroleum . Russian President Medvedev called the 297
agreement a ‘constructive model’ of cooperation in the Arctic region, which was increasingly 298
looming back into view. For Norway, this agreement could not have been more important. 
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Economically, the benefits were clear, but it also showed again why Norway was a valuable 
NATO partner, especially at a time of increased tension with Russia.  
As the abundance of natural resources, both in fish and petrochemical in the Arctic becomes 
increasingly apparent, the concomitant depletion of the polar ice cap has opened it up to the 
possibility of a sea route which would reduce the journey from Western Europe to East Asia by 
40%.   Norway, and to a lesser extent, Denmark, have an unmistakable strategic advantage in 
these developments, both for the economic opportunities, but also for the increased influence it 
will afford them in NATO. Norway has, in a 1950s manner, restated its policy of not allowing 
NATO bases on its soil in peacetime, while also finding that its ability to do business with the 
Kremlin can mitigate any disagreements with its allies.  
The initial wave of NATO enlargement was principally pursued by Denmark, as it found 
strategic advantage could be found in doing so. The period ends with enlargement largely side 
lined, but  with the possibilities for strategic advantage for each of our states moving into new 
areas. The High North is unique in that it brings together the interests, not just of large states 
such as the United States and Russia, but also smaller ones, in Canada, Denmark, Norway and 
even Iceland, together. The possibility of more cooperation in the area can even bring in 
geographically removed states like the Netherlands, with its status as a trading power, and 
potential entrepôt for Arctic resources.  
Finally, the Arctic also points to a future where NATO may have to shift some of its attention to 
‘in area’ responsibilities, bringing it, to some extent, full circle - Norway has found its niche 
again, as NATO's 'forgotten flank' seems less peripheral.  
     * * * 
In studying the policies of our states with regard to the enlargement of NATO, we see the first 
significant differences of opinion – but also an affirmation of the central thesis that, given the 
right circumstances, and smart leadership, small states can contribute, and become useful in 
the broader NATO context. The ‘serious and correct’ decision to extend NATO membership to 
the newly democratic states of Central and Eastern Europe was one which it will serve the 
strategic cultures of all three states, with regards to extending human rights and the rule of law – 
even if short term strategic calculations may have led to wariness from some in Norway, and to 
a lesser extent, the Netherlands. 
Denmark is the perfect example – as its ‘action space’ was transformed, it pursued this interest 
as a ‘pioneer’ into the Baltic States, exporting its own institutional and military values – 
exploiting the power it had in the asymmetric relationship with the Balts, and in doing so, it 
acted also in NATO’s interest, benefiting itself as the weaker party in that asymmetric 
relationship. By working informally as a proxy to do things which larger states could not do: 
demonstrating that niches were not confined to military capabilities and willingness to fight 
could also be matched by a willingness to talk – and talk effectively. And, even if the intentions 
could not be more different, Norway’s diplomatic capabilities and insight have proven useful to 
how NATO approached enlargement in the latter period. 
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Conclusion 

 On the 28th of March 2014, former Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg was 
nominated to replace Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO Secretary General. It was a long time in 
the making: Norway had lobbied for the position in the past, and there had been Norwegians 
leading organisations like the UN before, but this was the first time one had led an organisation 
with such an explicitly security-minded outlook. It reflected a sea-change in Norwegian 
strategic Culture, going back some 15 years, and also meant that the last three Secretaries 
General would have come from the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway. While the office of 
Secretary General is obviously largely symbolic, the appointment entails much lobbying and 
campaigning behind the scenes, and as such requires a large degree of focus, but also goodwill 
– it could also provide the basis for an interesting study with a more diplomatic focus than this 
one, and with access to the relevant diplomatic and government sources. Nevertheless, it still 
allows as to wonder what the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway have done to secure this 
goodwill?  

'Over the last fifty years the international community has created a gradually expanding 
multilateral structure of both formal and informal international institutions and treaties in order 
to organise relations and tackle problems. ' During the Cold War, this structure was ultimately 299
bound by two solid Blocs, distrustful of each other, and eager to ensure that none of their 
mutual allies caused significant dissent. The revolutions of 1989-91, which swept away that 
system forever, democratising a number of small and medium-sized Central and Eastern 
European States, and also throwing open a positive action space for (most) small states in the 
rest of Europe. While a solid 'threat' requires uniformity and obedience from small states, the 
diverse 'risks' that replaced this threat allow them latitude in their strategic outlook, and the 
opportunity to find themselves a niche.  
Anders Wivel (2005b) follows on from Robert Kagan's analysis of European FSP in general, and 
posits that small states, with Denmark as a perfect example, are 'moving beyond power politics, 
and making a virtue out of weakness; refusing to play by the rules of the Hobbesian world'. 
While before 1989, ‘norm entrepreneurship' could be pursued in a number of 'soft' ways, only 
in the Post-Cold War could these states explore a more security-oriented direction, and they 
have done so with some gusto. 
These three states have adapted their military and security policies to best serve their own, 
values based, strategic cultures. Through force structures - in most cases almost entirely 
removing any territorial defence element to their standing forces, and moving towards flexible, 
interoperable and rapidly deployable expeditionary units, when NATO needed them most; by 
finding niche capabilities, whether by doing things that other states cannot do - such as the 
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Royal Dutch Air Force in Kosovo - or by doing things that other states are not willing to do - as 
Denmark did in Afghanistan; and finally, by plotting a pioneering course through the stormy 
seas of the immediate Post-Soviet era to ensure that three Baltic States were successfully 
integrated into the Atlantic security architecture, and demonstrating that small states could find 
diplomatic niches in NATO too. 
And these changes were made in a manner which focused on what NATO wanted, and would 
allow them to contribute in the most effective way by delivering the ‘outputs’ few other states 
could. While Denmark and the Netherlands started the transformation relatively quickly, 
Norway serves as the example of a state which began rather later – but was convinced of the 
utility of transformation by its inability to contribute effectively to missions that served its 
broader foreign policy interests.  
Of course there was a natural affinity with the Atlantic world, something that had shaped 
attitudes to NATO to differing degrees during the Cold War, but these states went from being 
ones which relied on American protection to ones which could give America help. This can of 
course also be seen in a longer history of ensuring that that American influence balances the 
larger powers in Europe – and each of our states, through opt outs, political culture or by not 
being members of the European Union at all, were always going to be somewhat sceptical 
about the CSDP – something which underlines the observation, made in the introduction, that 
these three states have much in common, to an often overlooked degree. While the Netherlands 
and Norway have participated in common European structures, and in a time of unprecedented 
security, NATO is still seen as the best actor to ensure the extension of liberal peace and 
international law. 
This was something that would not necessarily been anticipated in 1989. All three of our states 
started with the hope and expectation that the United Nations would finally be able to fulfil its 
role as a global arbiter, but events in the early 1990s, most pertinently around UNPROFOR in 
Bosnia, events showed that NATO was the only reliable and effective security institution, 
especially when force was necessary. The conflicts in Kosovo, and in Afghanistan, showed that 
these states could contribute with new, but deliberate, niche capabilities, and Libya lit up a path 
for those states both willing and able to contribute in ways which belied their relational 
weakness towards other NATO member states.  
'What you need to do as a small state is to make yourself usable, and also someone who is 
sometimes necessary to go to. It makes sense to break down necessary into both necessary in 
terms of special abilities...then on willingness - for instance if you look at Danish security policy 
over the last two decades - one really important factor has been the Danish willingness to go 
where it has been dangerous, its willingness to accept that soldiers would die in combat.'   300
Exploiting the opportunities of the Post-Cold War space has been no easy task for small states, 
as the example of the Netherlands in Uruzgan illustrates. The example of Norway and Denmark 
shows us how positive changes can be affected, and strategic cultures transformed, over a 
period of time. While both may have started from a low point - 'the last Cold Warrior' and 
'Denmarkisation' respectively - a broad political and  institutional consensus, allied with a 
focused and practical policy towards the system, can bring broad benefits to the relationship 
with NATO and NATO allies: a ‘smart state’ strategy which could also serve as a model for the 
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Netherlands, which quickly and effectively enacted the structural reforms required for such a 
policy, but failed to find a coherent vision of its own. While it may be slightly larger than the 
other two, it remains capable of generating the ‘big picture’ necessary, and adaptation has long 
been a feature of Dutch national, never mind strategic, culture: thinking smaller, but smarter, 
could increase the ‘jointery’ that has been hitherto lacking. 
For both of our Nordic states, this is an era of unprecedented prominence - and is in complete 
contrast to the traditional concept of a small state 'hiding', as best illustrated by Danish pre-war 
Foreign Minister P. Munch:  'The first and last demand which we must make to Danish 
diplomacy is that it shall keep quiet and do its utmost to secure that we may live as unnoticed 
as possible '. Small states can now be assured that speaking out, should it be considered, 301
timely and matched by deeds, can be an effective and valuable foreign policy tool. Through 
these deeds, and their reliability have made them useful and relevant as security actors, 
something which is seen as succour enough for states with no ambitions beyond that. And they 
don’t even have to roar: what Robert Gates' speech in Brussels shows us is that, in this post-
Hobbesian space, is that small states can make even the largest states listen. 
It is tempting to see if there are lessons for more ‘system effective’ states, and for NATO in 
general from these findings. In the introduction we saw how small states do have a certain 
ability to adapt quickly and decisively that larger states may not – but nonetheless a template 
now exists for successful force transformation leading to increased engagement in NATO, which 
it would be foolish to ignore. If NATO as a whole is to become more effective, and reverse a 
downward trend in defence spending, it must have examples of how value can be obtained: 
and each increment towards 2% will have to be quantified – in a way, by pioneering ‘smart 
defence’ before it had a name, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway have each shown how 
more can be done with less, and more importantly, that all states, large and small, can 
positively contribute to the Atlantic community. 
Studying small states is therefore a valuable opportunity to find examples of best practice – but 
also a useful endeavour in itself, not least because the millions of Europeans who live in such 
states have as much interest in the foreign policy as those who live in larger ones.  
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